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ABSTRACT
I use experimental methodology to study interactions in the labor market which are
otherwise unobservable. In my experimental labor market, “workers” perform a real
effort task by solving character puzzles. The worker first solves a single practice puzzle
and then is paid to solve as many puzzles as possible in a 5-minute task period. I interpret
the puzzles solved in the 5-minute task period as the worker’s actual productivity, and the
time to complete the single practice puzzle as a noisy signal of that productivity. Based
on this noisy signal and other labor market characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, and
urban/rural, “employers” are given incentives to estimate the productivity of workers.1
Compared to observational data, my experimental methodology has four key advan-
tages. First, I precisely measure the workers’ productivity through their ability to solve
puzzles. This design eliminates the unobservable factors such as non-cognitive skills,
which are likely to affect real labor market outcomes. Second, I build a direct link
between the signal and the productivity using the uniform measure of puzzle-solving
ability. Third, I explicitly measure the workers’ self-confidence with a self-evaluation of
their puzzle-solving ability. This measure allows me to study the role of self-confidence in
the labor market. Finally, I can construct informative resumes for workers and observe
how employers interpret this information when evaluating workers.
In Chapter 1, “Diversity and Discrimination in Experimental Labor Markets,” I use
this experimental framework to study how stereotyping discrimination against ethnic
minorities depends on the shares of ethnic groups in the population. To this purpose, I
conduct the experiment with university students in two Chinese provinces: (1) a diverse
1Because the experiments are conducted in China, the labor market characteristics I consider are
those that are important in the Chinese labor market.
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province, where 60% of the population is Han Chinese; and (2) a non-diverse province,
where 99% of the population is Han Chinese. The stereotype against ethnic minorities
is measured by the employer’s estimate of minority workers’ productivity.
I find that: (1) Han and minority workers are equally productive; (2) in the non-
diverse province, Han employer productivity estimates are significantly lower for minor-
ity workers; (3) in the diverse population, a minority worker’s productivity is equally
estimated by Han and minority employers.
This research furthers our understanding of the economic effects of diversity. It
establishes a negative relationship between labor market stereotypes and diversity. Such
findings may also provide an explanation for why the inflows of immigrant workers in
some US states, like California, have continuously increased. My work suggests that
the immigrant workers are looking for diverse communities with lower stereotypes in the
labor market.
In Chapter 2, “Self-confidence and Wage in Experimental Labor Markets,” I study
how signaling self-confidence to employers increases the worker’s wage. Self-confidence is
an example of a non-cognitive skill, that is likely to be important in the labor market.2
My experimental framework provides an explicit measure for self-confidence: the worker’s
evaluation of their own productivity.
I find that for workers, being self-confident is a channel to signal high productivity
to employers. Specifically, signaling 1% higher self-confidence to employers increases the
employer estimate by 0.09%-0.21%, controlling for other labor market characteristics.
The results establish the signaling value of self-confidence in wage negotiations, and
highlight the importance of non-cognitive skills in the labor market.
Chapter 3 proposes a methodology to measure the value of worker characteristics.
In the design, employers buy worker characteristics in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) market. Specifically, employers claim a willingness to pay (WTP) for a char-
2Heckman and Rubinstein [48].
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acteristic. This characteristic is displayed on the resume if the WTP is higher than or
equal to a randomly determined price. The value of a characteristic is measured by the
magnitude of the WTP.
This methodology can be applied in pricing discrimination. The common method to
do so is an ex post approach, in which we study discrimination with a wage regression.
In such regressions we measure the discriminatory wage differential of a characteristic,
which is not related to the actual productivity, by looking at its coefficient in the regres-
sion. In our design, the discriminatory wage differential is measured by the WTP of a
characteristic.
Although Chapter 4 is not based on the experimental labor market, it serves as a
complementary study to Chapter 1. To demonstrate how indirect contact can influence
economic behavior, in this chapter, I study intergroup cooperation after observing in-
group members interacting with out-group members.
In the control treatment, a student is matched with someone from the other major in a
two-player public goods game. In another treatment, the game players watch intergroup
contact prior to the public goods game. The intergroup contact is defined by playing
a jigsaw puzzle with someone from the other major. I find that relative to the control
treatment, the contribution to the public goods after observing intergroup contact is
significantly higher. To distinguish intergroup contact effect from simply putting subjects
in a cooperative mood, the game players in a third treatment watch random contact.
The results show that it is important to have in-group members in the contact.
The results suggest that indirect contact can be applied when direct contact is re-
stricted. When intergroup cooperation is desired, yet one or more groups are not avail-
able, we can select some members from each group and perform demonstrations on the
rest. This is particularly useful for majority-minority intergroup cooperation, and for
groups that are segregated in many dimensions. Indirect contact also implies financial
freedom, as getting every group member involved in direct intergroup contact is very
xv
costly.
To summarize, my dissertation contributes to the growing experimental labor mar-
ket literature. Relative to data from the real labor markets, the experimental labor
markets allow us to study otherwise unobservable interactions. With such experimen-
tal labor markets, I study the relationship between stereotyping discrimination in the
labor market and diversity, the signaling value of self-confidence in wage negotiations,
and an alternative methodology to price worker characteristics. In addition, I study the
application of indirect contact in raising intergroup cooperation.
1CHAPTER 1. DIVERSITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN
EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS
We analyze through experiments how stereotype-based discrimination against ethnic
minorities depends on the shares of ethnic groups in the population. In our experimental
labor market, “employers” estimate productivity of “workers” who perform a real-effort
task. In some treatments, we provide subtle priming to employers about the ethnicity
of workers, in addition to providing information on expected productivity. We conduct
the experiment with university students in an ethnic non-diverse and an ethnic diverse
province in China. We find that: (1) Han and minority workers are equally productive;
(2) in the non-diverse population, Han employer estimates are significantly lower for
minority workers; (3) in the diverse population, a minority worker is equally estimated
by Han and minority employers. Our results establish a negative relationship between
stereotype-based discrimination and the share of minorities in the population. It is
further suggested that for discriminating employers, revealing the irrelevant ethnicity of
workers is not only unhelpful to the labor market, but can deteriorate it by creating
discriminatory income inequality between ethnic groups.
1.1 Introduction
Discrimination against ethnic minorities and women is often attributed to group
stereotypes. According to this narrative, employers systematically believe that work-
ers with certain ethnic or gender characteristics are less intelligent or less skilled than
2others. It is natural to assume that negative (or positive) stereotypes are more prevalent
in communities where the minority represents a smaller share of the population because
the majority lacks the chance of learning about the minority. This argument highlights
the importance of the diversity-promoting policies that provide people with opportu-
nities to communicate with each other to be able to achieve better understanding and
appreciation between different social groups.
Additionally, because of less prevalent stereotypes, it is not surprising that minority
workers may favor communities with higher shares of minority groups in the population,
resulting in self-selection of minorities into diverse communities. This supports the obser-
vation by Borjas [16], that close to three quarters of immigrants aged 18− 64, compared
to 50% in 1950, reside in six “immigrant states” in 1990: California, New York, Texas,
Florida, New Jersey and Illinois. In particular, California’s share of the foreign-born US
population increased from 10% in 1950 to 34% in 1990 while its share of the native US
population increased from 7% to only 10% during these years.
Finally, the economic gains of rapid industrialization and urbanization in develop-
ing countries are likely to be compromised by pre-existing stereotypes. For example,
economic growth in China has induced many minority, rural, or low income workers to
leave their hometown and migrate to large urban centers where Han and urban residents
make up the vast majority of the local population. However, historical segregation by
the Huji system may have caused serious stereotypes against migrants, farmers and mi-
norities. These stereotypes are reflected in the labor market as discrimination against
those workers, who can enjoy a greater economic welfare if the affiliated stereotypes are
mitigated.
We examine how stereotype-based discrimination is related with the shares of ethnic
groups in the population through a series of labor market experiments with students at
two Chinese universities. One university is located in one of the most ethnically diverse
provinces in the west of China, where only 60% of the population is Han Chinese. The
3second university serves an eastern province, where 99% of the population are Han
Chinese.
Our experimental design closely follows Mobius and Rosenblat [68] where an employer
sets a worker’s wage by guessing the worker’s productivity based on some signals. All
subjects first play the role of the “worker,” followed by the role of the “employer.” The
worker solves a single practice character puzzle and then is paid to solve as many char-
acter puzzles as possible in a 5-minute work period. The time that it takes the worker
to complete the single practice character puzzle is named the “signal.” The numbers of
puzzles that the worker completes in the 5-minute period is referred as the “productiv-
ity.” Subsequently, when subjects switch to the employer, each estimates 10 workers’
productivity. All employers see a mini-“resume” of each worker, which always includes
the worker’s gender and signal. A random subset of employers can also see each the
worker’s ethnicity. By comparing the estimates of employers who see workers’ ethnicity
to the estimates of the control group, we can measure stereotypes.
Compared to observational data, our experimental methodology has two key advan-
tages. First, because the signal and the productivity are measured by the same puzzle-
solving ability in our experiment, we can precisely measure the skill level of workers who
solve puzzles. Second, we can construct informative “resumes” for workers and observe
how employers interpret this information when evaluating workers. These two advan-
tages prevent employers in our experiment from considering unmeasured non-cognitive
factors in setting a worker’s wage. For example, personal preferences and interpersonal
skills may confound empirical studies, using education as an proxy for the productivity.
We find that Han and non-Han subjects perform equally well on the puzzle-solving
task. Nevertheless, minority workers in the non-diverse province are judged to perform
9%-10% lower than their Han peers. The source of this unequal treatment are Han
employers who lower their ability estimates by up to 14% for minority workers. In
contrast, Han employers in the diverse province do not discriminate against minorities.
4These findings establish a negative relationship between stereotype-based discrimination
and the share of ethnic minorities in the population, and enhance the importance of
diversity that has been discussed in other studies. For example, Boisjoly et al. [15] show
that white students are likely to show empathy toward all other ethnic minorities when
they are randomly assigned one or more African-American roommates. Another study
by Moody [69] shows that in American high schools, friendship segregation declines with
school heterogeneity levels.
Another result of our study is that the ethnicity of the worker does not matter when it
is not displayed even for discriminating employers. This suggests that revealing irrelevant
information is not only unhelpful to the labor market, but instead creates discriminatory
wage inequality between ethnic groups. We can eliminate the wage inequality by hiding
irrelevant worker characteristics from discriminating employers.
Our paper is part of a growing experimental labor market literature. The most closely
related work is Mobius and Rosenblat [68] who use a similar experiment to study the
origins of the “beauty premium.” Bertrand and Mullainathan [12] use a field experiment
to study racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market. They construct synthetic resumes
and respond to help-wanted advertisements in Boston and Chicago newspapers. Resumes
are randomly assigned typical white or African-American names. They find that resumes
with white names receive 50% more callbacks for interviews. The results provide explicit
evidence for racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market. In the Chinese labor market,
Maurer-Fazio [65] uses a similar approach and finds that Han Chinese are much more
likely to receive a callback from jobs posted on the internet. Fershtman and Gneezy
[36] use lab games to study types of discrimination in Israeli society. Gneezy, Leonard
and List [41] compare men and women in a patriarchal society and a matrilineal society.
They find that men in the patriarchal society compete more than women but the result
is reversed in the matrilineal society. A number of papers have analyzed patterns of
discrimination in the Chinese labor market. Zhang [97] compares gender differences in
5the willingness to enter a competition and finds no differences for Han Chinese but ethnic
minority boys compete more than girls. Liu et al. [62] and Dong and Bowles [31] find
that Chinese firms discriminate against female workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview to the
Chinese labor market and ethnic discrimination in China. Section 3 introduces the
experimental design. Data analysis is discussed in section 4. Our experimental results
are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 The Huji System
An important feature of the Chinese labor market is the Hukou, which is an official
registration record issued to every resident on household basis. The record shows infor-
mation about the individual, including the holder’s name, gender, family status, place
of origin, urban/rural status, ethnicity and employer. This system, called Huji, has been
in use since the year 400 B.C. Its modern version has been applied in China since the
year 1949.
Before the 1980s, the Chinese government imposed tough restrictions on population
mobility. Most of the restrictions were realized by Hukou inspections. Rural residents
were not allowed to migrate to cities; non-local workers were not permitted to look for
local jobs; migration across provinces, towns and even counties were restricted. Salaries,
infrastructure, commercial commodities and social welfare such as education, health
care and pensions usually favor more developed urban centers. This system made urban
Hukous highly desirable.
The economic reforms that started in the late 1970s removed many of the restrictions.
Rural residents were suddenly free to leave their poor hometown for big cities, in an
attempt to benefit from accelerating economic growth. For example, in the capital
6Beijing, the share of non-local Hukous in the local population increased from 19% in
2000, to 36% in 2010. The migration to the cities led to rapid urbanization: at the
beginning of the economic reforms, only 18% of the population lived in cities. In 2010,
this ratio increased to 50%.
Despite these reforms, some Hukou restrictions are still in place to limit mobility. For
example, non-local Hukou holders in cities are often limited in housing and automobile
markets. Consequently, some Hukou characteristics are still considered inferior.1 Some
studies suggest that the “Hukou gap” is even increasing (Knight and Song [57]).
Within cities, Hukou characteristics are important for wage determination. Meng
and Zhang [67] and Lu and Song [63] use case studies to show that ceteris paribus,
local urban workers earn more than rural migrant workers. A recent laboratory study
by Afridi et al. [2] demonstrates that inferior Hukou characteristics can even hurt self-
performance. They ask rural migrant students and local Beijing students to perform a
cognitive task and find that when the Hukou status is kept private, there is no difference
in the performance between these two groups. However, when it is made salient, rural
migrant students’ performance decreases by 10%.
1.2.2 Ethnic Minorities
The Chinese government distinguishes between 56 ethnic groups. The largest ethnic
group are the Han Chinese who account for 92% of the population. The remaining 114
million people belong to ethnic minorities. Most ethnic minorities are quite small: only
18 groups have populations above 1 million.
While ethnic minorities are distributed across all 31 Chinese provinces and districts,
its majority inhabit the western and northeastern regions (see map). In particular, five
provinces where about half of the local population are minorities are “ethnic autonomous
districts:” Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi and Ningxia. These autonomous
1See Fleisher and Chen [39], Kanbur and Zhang [55], Lin et al. [62], World Bank [93], and Yao and
Zhang [96].
7districts are authorized with self-regulation in some inner affairs under compliance with
the country’s constitution.
Figure 1.1 Map of China
Historically, native minorities are distinguished from Han Chinese in language, tra-
dition, clothes, food, culture, and even physical appearance.2 However, the economic
growth has induced many minorities, like other social groups, to migrate to urban re-
gions. Those migrants tend to mix up with local Han Chinese and look similar to them
in various aspects.
1.2.3 Ethnic Discrimination in China
As in many other countries, discrimination against minorities exist in the Chinese
labor market. Despite the fact that many migrant minorities look almost identical to
2Some minorities might be difficult to distinguish by physical appearance
8Han Chinese, employers can easily tell whether a worker is a minority or not because
ethnicity is a Hukou element. A substantial body of research has documented ethnic
discrimination in China and the wage gap between minorities and Han Chinese.3 Some
of this gap can be attributed to educational attainment: in 2005, for example, 18.5%
of Hans, but only 12.5% of minorities had high school diplomas. This education gap
is reduced in higher education due to affirmative actions: 5.7% of Hans and 4.2% of
minorities hold higher education diplomas. However, the empirical evidence seems to be
ambiguous. Some papers find no direct evidence of ethnic discrimination.4
There are at least two reasons that can account for the existence of stereotype-
based ethnic discrimination. First, the residential segregation between Han Chinese and
minorities would contribute to the formation of stereotypes. As mentioned before, ethnic
minorities used to inhabit the western and northeastern parts of the country. It is only in
the last 30 years that people started migrating. Because most of the migrations happened
when one moves to big urban centers, minorities are still rare in many Han inhabitants.
Thus, the insufficient contact between Han Chinese and minorities is a primary cause of
stereotypes.
Second, minorities benefit from certain affirmative action policies that apply to the
labor market, the financial market, schools and universities, politics and even China’s
birth control policy. For example, minority high school students are subsidized with
bonus credits in the national university entrance exam. However, according to Coate
and Loury [29], affirmative actions may create negative stereotypes against minorities.
3See Gustafsson and Shi [45], Hasmath et al. [46], Johnson and Chow [54], and Li [59].
4See Appleton et al. [5] and Yang [95].
91.3 The Experiment
1.3.1 Experimental Design
We simulate a labor market where the “employer” determines the wage of the “worker.”
All subjects start the experiment as the worker who solves character puzzles on the com-
puter. Figure 1.2 shows an example of the character puzzle. Each puzzle shows two
Figure 1.2 Character Puzzle
quadratic arrays of 7 times 7 characters of Latin alphabets. The two arrays are identical
except for two random positions where the characters differ. Workers have to find these
two locations and click them with their mouse.
In the first step as the worker, each subject is given two warm-up character puzzles.
Afterwards, the worker is asked to solve one practice character puzzle. The time that
it takes the worker to complete the practice character puzzle, which we will refer from
now on as the “signal,” is recorded by the experimenter. The signal and other personal
information on gender, urban/rural status, ethnicity, and province of origin are used to
construct the worker’s “resume.” In the last step, the worker has a 5-minute work period
to solve as many puzzles as possible and is rewarded with 40 points for each solved
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puzzle.5 The numbers of puzzles that the worker completes in the 5 minutes are referred
to from now on as the worker’s “productivity.” The sequence of the puzzles in each step
is identical for every subject, which means that the subjects are solving the same puzzles
appearing in the same order.
The subjects are then switched to the employer, who estimates workers’ productivity.
The estimated productivity is referred to from now on as the “employer belief” on a
worker. Each employer is randomly assigned to one out of four resume treatments. The
treatment determines how a worker’s resume is displayed to the employer:
TG: The employer sees the signal (“Practice time”on the example resume) and gender.
TGE: The employer sees ethnicity, in addition to TG.
TGEU: The employer sees urban/rural status, in addition of TGE.
TGPU: The employer sees origin of province and urban/rural status, in addition to
TG.
Examples of each type of resume are given in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3 Examples of Resumes by Treatments
TG TGE
Practice time: 18 Practice time: 20
Gender: male Gender: female
Evaluation: Ethnicity: Han
Evaluation:
TGEU TGPU
Practice time: 22 Practice time: 17
Gender: male Gender: female
Ethnicity: minority Origin of Province: Sichuan
Urban/Rural: Urban Urban/Rural: Rural
Evaluation: Evaluation:
5The experimental points are later converted to cash at a rate of 100 points = 1 Yuan ' $0.16.
11
Each employer evaluates ten other randomly selected workers and earns 150 points
for each evaluated resume. However, if the employer belief is different from a worker’s
productivity by x puzzles, the earnings are reduced by 10 · x points. For example, if a
worker solved 20 puzzles in the 5 minutes and the employer’s estimate is 18, the employer
receives 150− 10 · |20− 18| = 130 points.
The worker receives a wage of 40 points per average employer belief. For example,
if a worker is estimated by eight employers and the average employer belief is 20, the
worker receives a wage of 40 ·20 points. Therefore, the worker has two sources of income:
the productivity and the employer belief. This provides the worker with an incentive to
achieve comparable performance in the timed character puzzle and the 5-minute work
period.
1.3.2 Features of Our Design
1.3.2.1 The puzzle
English is a mandatory class in China’s education system. It is one of the test subjects
of the university entrance exam. Students formally start the course in the first year of
middle school. Nevertheless, many parents pay for early English education to get their
children well prepared before middle school. This implies that by the time of entrance
to the university, the students must have a decent level of English. Thus, the puzzle
containing basic Latin characters is simple enough for any university student. Minority,
gender, or other characteristics are not supposed to make any difference in puzzle-solving
ability. Moreover, the same sequence of puzzles shown to subjects guarantees that the
measured ability in solving puzzles is comparable.
1.3.2.2 The signal and the productivity
In our settings, the employer is provided with monetary incentives and a signal to
reveal a precise belief on a worker’s productivity. The signal thus has to be as informative
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as possible in predicting the productivity. We interpret the performance on the timed
character puzzle as the signal, because the timed character puzzle and the 5-minute work
period are highly comparable: (1) the task is the same: solving puzzles from the same
type; and (2) the worker is induced to perform identically in both.
Compared to studies with observational data that usually use years of schooling as the
signal, ours has the following advantages. First, it better links to the true productivity.
For example, college major and performance are frequently unavailable, making years of
schooling a less convincing index for the quality of education. Because the worker solves
the same type of puzzles for the timed character puzzle and the 5-minute work period,
our design provides the employer with a precise measure of the worker’s skill.
Second, the lack of unmeasurable non-cognitive factors, such as preference, that are as
important as cognitive skills in the labor market according to Heckman and Rubinstein
[48], may bias the estimation. For example, personal characteristics like interpersonal
skills and personality traits may affect a worker’s wage. In addition, certain types of
workers may value other things more than their work.6 Some women for example, may
place childbearing in priority instead of training or promotion opportunities. Other
workers may receive lower wages reflected by their lower willingness to negotiate.7 To
the contrary, the worker’s wage in our experiment is designed to be solely related to
productivity, leaving no space for the employer to interpret a worker’s wage as a function
of those unmeasurable factors.
Finally, the exclusion of workers belonging to specific social groups, like minorities,
in the early hiring and promotion stage may further bias the estimation. By design our
settings avoid such a problem.
6Fortin [40]
7Babcock and Laschever [7]
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1.3.2.3 The dual roles
Of course, the discussed benefits are based on the fact that the employer has good
information on what the worker does in the experiment. This is another feature of our
design: the dual roles of the subject. Self-experience could provide the employer with
the better information on the worker’s task than any other descriptive words would do.
In the real world, many human resource officers are themselves employees. For instance,
university search committee members are mostly professors by themselves.
1.3.3 Data
We conduct our experiment with students at two Chinese universities. One of the
universities is located in a non-diverse province and we will refer to it from now on as the
“Non-diverse” location. In this province, fewer than 1% of the population are members of
ethnic minorities, which is below the national average. The second university is located
in a diverse western province, which is considered one of China’s most ethnically diverse
provinces, and 40% of the population belongs to ethnic minorities. We will refer to this
university as the “Diverse ”location.
We contacted students through their class supervisors and obtained their consent
to participate in an experiment.8 Due to different lab sizes, subjects at Non-diverse are
divided into two sessions whereas subjects in Diverse are divided into four sessions. Each
session lasted about 50 minutes and sessions were conducted back to back in order to
reduce communication between students about the nature of the experiment.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of subjects’ demographic characteristics. We
recruited 281 students from agronomy, forestry and horticulture majors and 276 stu-
dents from agricultural products, agronomy, Chinese medicinal herbs, environment and
resources, horticulture and plant protection majors at Non-diverse and Diverse, respec-
8In Chinese universities, the department is divided into classes. Each class has a supervisor whose
duty is to oversee a student’s curriculum and extracurricular activities.
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tively. Participants are all of similar ages as they are all freshmen. We over-sampled
ethnic minority students at Non-diverse to obtain a reasonable mix of minority and Han
students in our experiment. At Diverse, the share of ethnic minorities among univer-
sity students reflects the population shares in the province because most students are
local. The table also shows the average earnings of subjects from (1) solving puzzles in
the 5-minute work period, (2) worker wages averaged on employer estimates, and (3)
the employer’s earnings from evaluating workers. Combined earnings at both locations
were similar: Non-diverse participants earned 21.5 Yuan ($3.3) and Diverse participants
earned 22.1 Yuan ($3.4) during the course of the experiment.9
1.4 Measuring the Minority Stereotype
1.4.1 Analysis Strategy
Since the minority stereotype is defined as the wrong belief regarding minorities, the
criterion to judge its existence in our settings is the comparison between a minority
worker’s productivity and the employer belief about the minority worker. There is no
stereotype if the worker’s ethnic status has the same impact on the productivity and the
employer belief. To this purpose, we first check to see if ethnic status is a good predictor
to a worker’s productivity. Then we look at how an employer interprets a worker’s ethnic
status when evaluating the worker.
The stereotype that can be found from the above strategy is the population mean
at each experimental location. However, the different degrees of diversity at the two
locations have two effects on the mean minority stereotyping. One is the exposure effect
we are interested in: the higher chance of inter-ethnicity interactions at Diverse eliminates
minority stereotyping. It is possible that there is no such an exposure effect but we still
find a lower mean minority stereotype at Diverse, simply because the share of persons
9The opportunity cost of one hour for a university student, e.g. tutoring a school kid, is about 20
Yuan in the two provinces.
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with stereotypes in the population is low. A natural way of separating these two effects is
a division between Han employers and minority employers. Comparing Hans with Hans
at the two experimental locations allows us to focus on the exposure effect.
1.4.2 Econometric Analysis
Following the above identification strategy, we construct the following model:
ln(Productivityj) = α+ β ln(300/Signalj) + δMinorityj + γXj + µj (1.1)
ln(Employer Belief ij) = ζ + η ln(300/Signalj) + θMinorityj + λXj + Ei + νij (1.2)
where Productivityj is worker j’s productivity, 300/Signalj is worker j’s signal converted
to an equivalent number of puzzles in 5 minutes, Minorityj is a dummy variable with the
value of 1 if worker j is a minority and 0 otherwise, Xj is a vector of worker j’s other labor
market characteristic dummies: female, rural, province of origin, Employer Belief ij is
employer i’s estimate on worker j’s productivity, and Ei is a dummy variable with the
value of 1 for employer i, and 0 otherwise.
Equation 1.1 is referred to as the “Productivity Regression.” It looks for good pre-
dictors to a worker’s productivity. For example, β measures the additional percents of
puzzles a worker would complete in the 5-minute work period if he/she performs 1%
better in the converted timed character puzzle. The productivity difference between
minorities and Hans is measured by the coefficient δ on the dummy variable Minority,
of which a positive (negative) value implies a higher (lower) puzzle-solving ability by
minorities.
Equation 3.2 is the “Belief Regression,” which tells us what an employer is looking for
when evaluating a worker. Compared to the Productivity Regression, the explanatory
variable Ei is added to capture the employer’s personal tastes or preferences, such as
generosity or jealousy. The coefficient η means that if a worker performs 1% better in the
converted timed character puzzle, the employer would give an η% higher estimate to the
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numbers of puzzles the worker would complete in 5 minutes. The minority stereotype is
captured by the coefficient θ on the variable Minority, which is interpreted as compared
to a Han worker, the employer would give a θ percent higher/lower, depending on the
sign of θ, estimate to the numbers of puzzles a minority worker would complete in the
5-minute work period.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Overview
In order to have a general picture on Han and minority workers’ productivity, we
display distributions of numbers of puzzles solved in the 5-minute task period in the
following two figures. Figure 1.4 draws the performance of Han and minority workers
at Non-diverse. To identify any difference in the performance, we conduct three tests:
Bartlett’s test for equal variances, t test for equal means, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
for equal distributions. The statistics reported at the right side of the graph suggest that
at the significance level of 5%, the null hypothesis that Han and minority workers have
similar performance is not rejected. Likewise, Figure 1.5 suggests that Han and minority
workers at Diverse performed similarly in the 5-minute task period as well.
1.5.2 Productivity Regression
Table 1.2 reports the results of the Productivity Regression. The strongest predic-
tor of productivity is the converted timed character puzzle: a one percent increase in
(300/Signal) significantly raises the productivity by 0.31% at Non-diverse and 0.32 per-
cent at Diverse. Ethnic status and urban/rural have no significant impact on a worker’s
productivity. The only other resume variable which has any affect is the gender dummy
at Diverse.
The results verified that once the performance on the timed character puzzle and
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Figure 1.4 Numbers of Puzzles Solved in the 5-Minute Task Period
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other characteristics are controlled for, there is no significant difference in the puzzle-
solving ability between Hans and minorities at both experimental locations. The next
step is to check if ethnic status matters in employer estimates.
1.5.3 Belief Regression
The results for each treatment and experimental locations are shown in Table 1.3. The
employers interpret the converted timed character puzzle pretty well: ln(300/Signal) is
significantly positive in every treatment and experimental location. For example, 0.35
in Column (1) implies that if a worker performs one percent better in the converted
timed character puzzle, the employer gives a 0.35 percent higher estimate to the num-
bers of puzzles the worker would complete in the 5-minute work period. In particular,
employers do a good job of interpreting the signal: the coefficients of ln(300/Signal)
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(except Column (3)) are close to their counterpart in the Productivity Regression. The
good performance of employers in interpreting the signal implies that the nature of the
character puzzle is well understood by subjects.
The variable Minorty is only significantly negative in columns (5) and (7). The two
significant coefficients −0.11 and −0.08 suggest that employers at Non-diverse believe
that, compared to Han workers, the minority workers would complete 11% and 8% fewer
puzzles in the 5-minute work period. However, for employers at Non-diverse who do
not see the worker’s ethnicity (treatments TG and TGPU) and employers at Diverse
(all treatments), minority status does not matter for employer estimates. Therefore,
the average minority stereotype at Non-diverse is around 10% while there is no such a
stereotype at Diverse.
Comparing the impact of the variable Minority on employer estimates at Non-diverse
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across the four treatments, its insignificance in treatments where the worker’s ethnicity is
not displayed (TG and TGPU) implies that it is better to hide this irrelevant information
from employers. For minority workers, once their ethnicity is revealed, they receive a
lower estimate than Han workers by about 10%. In this case, irrelevant information such
as the worker’s ethnicity is not only unhelpful to the labor market but deteriorates it by
creating discriminatory wage inequality between ethnic groups.
Next, as suggested by the identification strategy, we separate the employers into Han
employers and minority employers to focus on the exposure effect. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 are
the results of Belief Regression for treatments TG and TGPU, where employers do not see
the worker’s ethnicity. Except the Han employers in treatment TGPU at Non-diverse, all
employers use the converted Signal as a very important predictor to evaluating workers.
The coefficients on ln(300/Signal), with the exception in the first column, ranging from
0.21 to 0.57, are all significant at 1%. The ethnic status of a worker does not matter
for employer estimates: Minority is not significant across all types of employers and
experimental locations. This is straightforward since employers do not see the ethnic
status of the worker.
We turn to treatments TGE and TGEU, where employers do see the ethnic sta-
tus of the worker. Results are displayed in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. The coefficient on
ln(300/Signal) is significantly positive across all treatments, experimental locations and
types of employers, ranging from 0.15 to 0.35. The coefficients of Minority are now
significantly negative only for Han employers at Non-diverse (see −0.14 and −0.08 in
the first columns of Table 1.6 and Table 1.7, respectively). This suggests that minority
workers are discriminated against only by Han employers at Non-diverse. Minority em-
ployers at Non-diverse behave like all employers at Diverse: they give equal estimates
to both Hans and minorities. Therefore, the pure exposure effect of diversity eliminates
minority stereotypes by 8% and 14%. In addition, revealing the irrelevant ethnicity of a
worker to discriminating employers creates an income inequality of 8% and 14% between
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ethnic groups.
Note that because the coefficients −0.14 and −0.08 are stereotypes of the discrim-
inating Han employers, they serve as a lower bound of the mean stereotype found in
Column (5) and Column (7) in Table 1.3, respectively. In other words, the latter should
not be significantly lower than the former. This can be verified by checking that the
latter coefficients fall in the confidence intervals of the former ones: (−0.21, −0.01) and
(−0.14, -0.02) respectively.
1.5.4 Checking Structural Differences between Treatments
Because the results are obtained from separating Belief Regression into four treat-
ments, one concern is that the treatments might be structurally different. If this is the
case, we have obtained the results simply because of the treatment effect. To check
this, we pool across all treatments and include treatment dummies in Belief Regression.
The labor market characteristic dummies are modified: a variable is now 1 if it can be
observed by employers and its previous dummy value is 1, and 0 otherwise. For exam-
ple, a minority worker in treatment TG has the value of 0 for the variable Minority,
because ethnicity is not observed by employers in this treatment. Results are shown in
Table 1.8. As no treatment has a significant effect on employer estimates, we conclude
that the treatments are structurally identical. Other results are consistent with previous
ones. Minority workers at Non-diverse are underestimated by 7%, particularly by Han
employers. The minority status does not matter for minority employers at Non-diverse
and all employers at Diverse.
1.5.5 Employer Profit
We find in the previous section that minority workers’ productivity is underestimated
by Han employers at Non-diverse. In this section, we examine from the employer’s point
of view the next question: do discriminating employers make more (less) profit from
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evaluating workers’ productivity?
The profit that an employer makes from evaluating a worker is defined before as
150− 10 · |mistake| points, where mistake is the difference between the worker’s actual
productivity and the employer belief. Consider the following equation:
Employer Profitij = pi + ρMinorityj + φXj + τ i + σij (1.3)
where Employer Profitij is the profit that employer i makes from evaluating worker
j, Minorityj is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if worker j is a minority and
0 otherwise, Xj is a vector of worker j’s other labor market characteristic dummies:
female, rural, province of origin, and τ i is the employer fixed effect. In this equation,
the change of employer profit between evaluating a Han worker and a minority worker
is measured by the coefficient ρ.
Like before, we sort the employers to four types: Han at Non-diverse, minority at
Non-diverse, Han at Diverse, and minority at Diverse, and run this regression for each
treatment. Tables 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 report the results for treatment TG, TGPU, TGE,
and TGEU, respectively. Except Han employers at Diverse in treatments TG and TEGU,
all employers make the same profit from evaluating Han and minority workers. Thus,
despite their stereotype against minority workers, Han employers at Non-diverse do not
make lower profits than other types of employers from evaluating worker productivity.
1.5.6 Comparing the Quality of Employer Estimation between Diverse and
Non-diverse
We adopt the methodology by Granger [44] and Mankiw and Shapiro [64] to evaluate
the quality of employer estimation. Specifically, we examine who are the better forecast-
ers, the Han employers or the minority employers, at Diverse or Non-diverse. Consider
the following model:
ln(Productivityj) = a+ bln(Employer Beliefi) + cXj + di + φij, (1.4)
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and the following hypotheses:
1. a=0;
2. b=1;
3. c=0.
The first two hypotheses state that the estimates are unbiased, because high quality of
estimation means that the plots of Employer Belief and Productivity would look similar.
The third hypothesis tests the efficiency of the estimates. Since good employer estimation
should have contained all useful information that can predict the actual productivity,
the coefficients of these information should be 0 once Employer Belief is controlled for.
Employers are rational if both unbiasedness and efficiency are satisfied.
Results for treatment TG are displayed in Table 1.13. The constants are signifi-
cantly higher than 0 in every column. Hence Hypothesis 1 is rejected for the two types
of employers at both experimental locations. Although we reject Hypothesis 2 for all
four groups of employers as well, employers at Diverse perform better than those at
Non-diverse because the coefficient b is significantly higher than 0 and closer to its null
hypothesis value of 1.
To test Hypothesis 3, we conduct a joint F test. The first two rows of Table 1.17
report the F statistics and the corresponding P values in the prentices. At the significance
level of 5%, Hypothesis 3 is rejected for all four groups of employers.
Regression results for treatments TGPU, TGE, and TGEU are shown in Table 1.14,
Table 1.15, and Table 1.16, respectively. Like in treatment TG, Hypothesis 1 is rejected
for every type of employers and experimental location, because the constants are all
significantly higher than 0. Hypothesis 2 is rejected for all four groups of employers too.
Nevertheless, Han employers at Diverse perform better than others in the estimation,
as their coefficient b is significantly higher than 0, and closer to 1 than other type of
employers.
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The last three rows of Table 1.17 show the F statistics for the three treatments.
Hypothesis 3 is not rejected only for minority employers at Non-diverse in treatment
TGE. Therefore, except those employers, all other employers are not efficient enough.
Combining the results for the three hypotheses, we conclude that the quality of the
employer estimation can be easily improved in terms of unbiasedness and efficiency.
1.6 Conclusions
We find that Han employers at Non-diverse systematically underestimate minority
workers by about 10%. To the contrary, Han employers at Diverse give equal estimates to
both Hans and minorities. The results provide some evidence that experience and social
proximity can reduce stereotypes. Our experiment does not imply that social proximity
eliminates discrimination: stereotypes are only one source of discrimination in the labor
market. Taste-based discrimination can be present even in the absence of stereotypes.
A valuable comment on the result is that, we would consider the self-selection issue.
Since randomization in this case is almost impossible, the best way to completely solve
the self-selection problem is to look for a difference-by-difference approach. Thus we
conduct the experiment with university freshmen the first time at the entrance to the
campus, and the second time one or two years later. By looking at the difference between
these two time spots, we can know the impact that the diverse location has on individuals.
Another comment on the paper relates the results to the Hawthorne effect, which
refers the phenomenon in which subjects modify their behavior when knowing they are
experimentally studied. We propose three reasons to argue that there is hardly the
Hawthorne effect in our results. First, discriminating against someone is publicly viewed
as a negative image. Hence the reasonable modification to the behavior would be hiding
the discrimination from instead of showing it to the experimenter. Second, because of
the identical experiment manipulation, the Hawthorne effect would show up in both ex-
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perimental locations. But since employers at Diverse do not discriminate, it is doubtful
that only employer at Non-diverse exhibit the Hawthorne effect. Finally, other character-
istics like gender and urban/rural are also displayed on the resume. As subjects do not
know the real objective of the experiment, which is about ethnicity, the Hawthorne effect
would apply to all other characteristics as well. However, we did not find a systematic
overestimation or underestimation of other characteristics. Therefore, we conclude that
the Hawthorne effect is ignorable in our experiment.
We can consider some extensions to this paper. For example, we ask employers to
make hiring decisions instead of estimating productivity. This is a reasonable modifica-
tion since discrimination is easier to happen in the hiring stage than the wage setting
stage. In addition, to study the relationship between economic cycles and intergroup
discrimination, we ask employers to select workers to limited vacant positions. During
depressions, there are fewer vacant jobs and we check if there is more or less discrimina-
tion.
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Table 1.2 Productivity Regression
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
ln(300/Signal) 0.31∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Minority 0.09 -0.02
(0.07) (0.04)
Female 0.07 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Urban 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
N 275 272
R2 0.30 0.26
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.4 Belief Regression: Han vs. Minority
Employers in Treatment TG
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(300/Signal) 0.38∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
Minority -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07
(0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04)
Female -0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)
Urban 0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
N 39 8 32 16
R2 0.35 0.55 0.22 0.59
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 1.5 Belief Regression: Han vs. Minority
Employers in Treatment TGPU
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(300/Signal) 0.07 0.53∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05)
Minority -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.06) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04)
Female -0.09∗ -0.14 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
Urban 0.01 -0.12 0.07 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
N 39 9 27 18
R2 0.11 0.45 0.41 0.19
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.6 Belief Regression: Han vs. Minority
Employers in Treatment TGE
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(300/Signal) 0.30∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05)
Minority -0.14∗∗ -0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.13) (0.04) (0.03)
Female -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.06
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
N 39 9 24 23
R2 0.21 0.45 0.32 0.17
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 1.7 Belief Regression: Han vs. Minority
Employers in Treatment TGEU
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(300/Signal) 0.30∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Minority -0.08∗∗ -0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Female -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban 0.00 0.03 0.05∗ -0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
N 114 24 76 61
R2 0.23 0.14 0.27 0.25
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.8 Belief Regression: Pooled Across
Treatments
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers All Han Minority All Han Minority
ln(300/Signal) 0.28∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Minority observed -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Female -0.04∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban observed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
TGE 0.03 0.00 0.15 -0.02 0.05 -0.09
(0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.1)
TGEU -0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)
TGPU -0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.20 0.27 -0.05
(0.10) (0.11) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.28)
N 281 231 50 277 159 118
R2 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.23
a. Baseline treatment: TG.
b. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
c. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.9 Profit Regression: Treatment TG
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
Minority -8.28 -16.61 9.15∗ -8.03
(8.04) (20.61) (4.12) (7.30)
Female 0.42 8.36 3.97 -8.61
(6.11) (12.44) (4.24) (7.80)
Urban 8.16 -8.67 -7.25 -0.58
(5.94) (10.81) (4.68) (8.32)
N 39 8 32 16
R2 0.17 0.48 0.05 0.02
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 1.10 Profit Regression: Treatment TGPU
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
Minority 21.71 -8.58 2.46 -4.45
(14.70) (20.92) (3.26) (5.79)
Female 13.01 8.03 -1.20 -12.67
(9.42) (13.65) (3.21) (5.96)
Urban 10.98 4.33 0.09 2.13
(9.23) (12.16) (3.50) (6.18)
N 39 9 27 18
R2 0.11 0.33 0.04 0.12
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.11 Profit Regression: Treatment TGE
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
Minority 4.96 3.89 2.80 0.36
(8.69) (30.92) (6.51) (4.59)
Female 7.29 24.40 -5.01 6.69
(6.17) (20.85) (6.59) (4.83)
Urban 4.46 -22.03 5.89 5.48
(5.94) (21.12) (6.98) (5.00)
N 39 9 24 23
R2 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.06
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 1.12 Profit Regression: Treatment TGEU
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
Minority 5.99 -9.07 -7.05∗∗ -0.77
(6.02) (14.35) (2.59) (2.93)
Female 9.64 14.69 -1.30 -5.50
(4.40) (10.43) (2.64) (2.94)
Urban 2.84 -26.16 -1.93 10.21∗∗
(4.25) (10.15) (2.90) (3.21)
N 114 24 76 61
R2 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.03
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.13 Rational Expectation Regression:
Treatment TG
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(Employer Belief) 0.08 0.23 0.21∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09)
Minority -0.09 0.10 0.04 0.01
(0.07) (0.15) (0.04) (0.06)
Female 0.03 -0.17 0.13∗∗ 0.11
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06)
Urban 0.11∗ 0.12 0.12∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
Constant 2.27∗∗ 2.09∗∗ 1.93∗∗ 2.21∗∗
(0.30) (0.42) (0.30) (0.34)
N 39 8 32 16
R2 0.19 0.58 0.17 0.27
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.14 Rational Expectation Regression:
Treatment TGPU
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(Employer Belief) 0.13 0.24 0.24∗∗ 0.14
(0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.09)
Minority 0.19∗ 0.22 0.03 -0.01
(0.07) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04)
Female 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.04
(0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban 0.14∗∗ 0.13 0.08 0.18∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant 2.51∗∗ 1.94∗∗ 2.10∗∗ 2.68∗∗
(0.23) (0.42) (0.26) (0.37)
N 39 9 27 18
R2 0.27 0.51 0.22 0.35
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.15 Rational Expectation Regression:
Treatment TGE
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(Employer Belief) 0.06 0.00 0.26∗∗ 0.15
(0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09)
Minority -0.08 -0.13 0.01 -0.05
(0.06) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05)
Female 0.00 -0.12 0.14∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05)
Urban 0.05 -0.13 0.21∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 2.41∗∗ 2.62∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 2.79∗∗
(0.21) (0.50) (0.28) (0.35)
N 39 9 24 23
R2 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.22
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 1.16 Rational Expectation Regression:
Treatment TGEU
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
ln(Employer Belief) 0.04 0.03 0.25∗∗ 0.10
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05)
Minority -0.08∗ -0.14 -0.06∗ -0.04
(0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03)
Female -0.05 -0.04 0.07∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Urban 0.09∗∗ 0.06 0.03 0.08∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 2.55∗∗ 2.56∗∗ 1.78∗∗ 2.48∗∗
(0.13) (0.34) (0.17) (0.20)
N 114 24 76 61
R2 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.15
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 1.17 F Tests for Hypothesis 3
Experimental location Non-diverse Diverse
Employers Han Minority Han Minority
TG 2.43 2.52 3.49 2.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
TGPU 3.80 1.84 2.37 4.94
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
TGE 3.81 0.96 6.79 3.34
(0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00)
TGEU 6.39 2.33 6.30 5.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
a. Corresponding p-values are indicated in the prentices.
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CHAPTER 2. SELF-CONFIDENCE AND WAGE IN
EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS
Being self-confident is a channel to signal high ability. We analyze through experi-
ments how signalling higher self-confidence to employers can increase the worker’s wage.
In our experimental labor market, “employers” estimate productivity of “workers” who
perform a real-effort task. To help with the estimation, we provide employers with
“resumes” containing worker characteristics like the expected productivity, ethnicity,
gender, and urban/rural. In addition, the worker sends to employers a self-evaluation
of the productivity. We find that controlling for other factors, more confident workers
are predicted to be more productive by employers. Specifically, signalling 1% higher
self-confidence increases the employer estimate by 0.14%-0.31%, depending on a treat-
ment. Our results establish the signalling value of self-confidence in wage negotiations,
and highlight the importance of non-cognitive skills in the labor market.
2.1 Introduction
Non-cognitive skills are as important as cognitive skills in many dimensions of social
performance (Heckman et al. [49]). In some cases, the former is even found to be more
important. For example, Duckworth and Seligman [32] find that for school students,
self-discipline accounts for more than twice as much variance as IQ in final grades, high
school selection, school attendance, hours spent doing homework, hours spent watching
television (inversely), and the time of day students began their homework.
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As social performance is closely related to productivity, the labor market is a place
where the non-cognitive skills matter significantly. Heckman and Rubinstein [48] first
pointed out the importance of non-cognitive skills by observing the wage differentials
between two groups of high school dropouts: the General Educational Development
(GED) recipients and others. The GED is a program that administers exams equating
high school dropouts psychometrically to high school graduates. The data reveals that
the GED recipients earn more than other high school dropouts but this wage gap is
reversed if controlling for schooling factors. Heckman and Rubinstein [48] argue that
this is due to the lack of non-cognitive skills of the GED recipients who are cognitively
bright. Another evidence comes from Persico et al. [75], who investigate why taller
workers receive a wage premium. They find that what matters is the adolescent height
but not the adult height. They attribute this height difference in wage to different
non-cognitive skills developed in school non-academic activities between tall and short
students.
We study the impact of a specific element in the set of non-cognitive skills, the
self-confidence, on labor market outcomes. In particular, we examine how signalling
higher self-confidence to employers can increase the worker’s wage, in the process of wage
negotiation. This is identified by Benabou and Tirole [10] as the “signalling value” of
demanding self-confidence. Individuals obtain a value from being self-confident, because
it is a channel to signal high ability. In simple words, in order to convince others that one
has high ability, oneself needs to be convinced. Self-confidence also creates a consumption
value, when thinking of oneself favorably makes a person happier. In this case, it is
another consumption good that affects one’s utility. The motivation value exists because
self-confidence improves the individual’s motivation to tackle difficulties in the pursuit
of his goals, and thus brings more successes.
Our experimental design closely follows Mobius and Rosenblat [68] where an employer
sets a worker’s wage by guessing the worker’s productivity, based on the worker’s labor
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market characteristics. All subjects first play the role of the “worker,” followed by the role
of the “employer.” The worker solves a single practice character puzzle and then is paid
to solve as many character puzzles as possible in a 5-minute work period. The time that
it takes the worker to complete the single practice character puzzle is named the “signal.”
The numbers of puzzles that the worker completes in the 5-minute period is referred as
the “productivity.” Subsequently, workers are informed about their expected productivity,
which is calculated as 300/signal, and are asked to give a self-evaluation to their actual
productivity. The difference between the worker’s self-evaluation and his/her expected
productivity is referred to as the worker’s “self-confidence.” When subjects switch to the
employer, each estimates 10 workers’ productivity. All employers see a mini-“resume”
of each worker, which includes the worker’s labor market characteristics. Afterwards,
the employer has a chance of revising the estimation. For the revision, the employer is
provided with the same resume, the previous estimate, plus the worker’s self-evaluation.
Compared to observational data, our experimental methodology has four key advan-
tages. First, we precisely measure the skill level of workers with the puzzle-solving ability.
Second, with this uniform measure of ability, we build a direct link between the signal
and the productivity. Third, we explicitly measure the worker’s self-confidence. Finally,
we can construct informative resumes for workers and observe how employers interpret
this information when evaluating workers.
We find that when self-confidence is explicitly signalled to the employer, more con-
fident workers receive higher employer estimates. The magnitude of the impact is not
small: signalling 1% higher self-confidence increases the employer estimate by 0.14%-
0.31%, controlling for all other labor market characteristics. Out results provide explicit
evidence to how signalling self-confidence can convince employers about one’s high abil-
ity. Thus we establish the signalling value of self-confidence identified by Benabou and
Tirole [10]. It also supports the study by Burks et al. [19], who claim that “overconfi-
dence is induced by the desire to send positive signals to others about one’s own skill.”
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The income gap between some social groups can be explained by our results partly. For
example, as men are shown to be more confident than women, our results suggest that
men would make more in the labor market.
Out paper is part of the literature that links self-confidence to labor market out-
comes. In a similar experimental labor market, Mobius and Rosenblat [68] decompose
the beauty premium into oral and visual stereotypes, and self-confidence. Since phys-
ical attractiveness is positively associated with self-confidence, more beautiful workers
are more confident in the labor market and thus receive a higher wage. Niederle and
Vesterlund [70] explain the gender gap in high paid executive positions by investigating
men and women’s preference for competition. They find that in spite of being equally
capable, men are more overconfident and like competition more than women. Falk et al.
[34] use an experiment to show that more confident people engage more actively in job
search. Empirically, Goldsmith et al. [43] show that a person’s wage is more sensitive to
changes in self-esteem than to comparable alterations in human capital.
Our paper is also part of a growing experimental labor market literature. Bertrand
and Mullainathan [12] use a field experiment to study racial discrimination in the U.S.
labor market. They construct synthetic resumes and respond to help-wanted advertise-
ments in Boston and Chicago newspapers. Resumes are randomly assigned typical white
or African-American names. They find that resumes with white names receive 50% more
callbacks for interviews. The results provide explicit evidence for racial discrimination
in the U.S. labor market. In the Chinese labor market, Maurer-Fazio [65] uses a similar
approach and finds that Han Chinese are much more likely to receive a callback from
jobs posted on the internet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental
design. Results are reported in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2.2 The Experiment
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We simulate a labor market where the “employer” determines the wage of the “worker.”
All subjects start the experiment as the worker who solves character puzzles on the com-
puter. Figure 2.1 shows an example of the character puzzle. Each puzzle shows two
Figure 2.1 Character Puzzle
quadratic arrays of 7 times 7 characters of Latin alphabets. The two arrays are identical
except for two random positions where the characters differ. Workers have to find these
two locations and click them with their mouse.
In the first step as the worker, each subject is given two warm-up character puzzles.
Afterwards, the worker is asked to solve one practice character puzzle. The time that
it takes the worker to complete the practice character puzzle, which we will refer to
from now on as the “signal,” is recorded by the experimenter. The signal and other
personal characteristics of ethnicity, gender, urban/rural, and origin of province are used
to construct the worker’s “resume.”
In the last step, the worker has a 5-minute work period to solve as many puzzles as
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possible and is rewarded with 40 points for each solved puzzle.1 The numbers of puzzles
that the worker completes in the 5 minutes are referred to from now on as the worker’s
“productivity.” The sequence of the puzzles in each step is identical for every subject,
which means that the subjects are solving the same puzzles appearing in the same order.
Following the practice puzzle but before proceeding to the 5-minute task period, the
worker is informed of his/her expected productivity, which is calculated as 300 seconds
divided by the signal. The worker then is asked to give an estimate to his/her actual
productivity. We interpret the difference between the self-evaluation and the expected
productivity as the worker’s self-confidence. When the self-evaluation is higher (lower)
than the expected productivity, the worker is over-confident (underconfident). A correct
report of the self-evaluation is rewarded with 50 points.
The subjects are then switched to the employer, who estimates workers’ productivity.
The estimated productivity is referred to from now on as the “employer belief” on a
worker. Each employer is randomly assigned to one out of four resume treatments. The
treatment determines how a worker’s resume is displayed to the employer:
TG: The employer sees the signal (“Practice time”on the example resume) and gender.
TGE: The employer sees ethnicity, in addition to TG.
TGEU: The employer sees urban/rural status, in addition of TGE.
TGPU: The employer sees origin of province and urban/rural status, in addition to
TG.
Examples of each type of resume are given in Figure 2.2.
Next, the employers is given a chance of revising the estimation. In addition to what
is previously displayed on the resume, the worker’s self-confidence is displayed as well.
Examples are given in Figure 2.3. We refer to the revised estimation as the “revised
employer belief.”
1The experimental points are later converted to cash at a rate of 100 points = 1 Yuan ' $0.16.
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Figure 2.2 Examples of Resumes by Treatments
TG TGE
Practice time: 18 Practice time: 20
Gender: male Gender: female
Evaluation: Ethnicity: Han
Evaluation:
TGEU TGPU
Practice time: 22 Practice time: 17
Gender: male Gender: female
Ethnicity: minority Origin of Province: Sichuan
Urban/Rural: Urban Urban/Rural: Rural
Evaluation: Evaluation:
Each employer evaluates 10 other randomly selected workers and earns 150 points
for each evaluated resume. However, if the employer belief is different from a worker’s
productivity by x puzzles, the earnings are reduced by 10 · x points. For example, if
a worker solved 20 puzzles in the 5 minutes and the employer’s estimate is 18, the
employer receives 150− 10 · |20− 18| = 130 points. For each employer, the actual payoff
is determined by a random draw between the employer belief and the revised employer
belief.
The worker receives a wage of 40 points per average employer belief, or revised em-
ployer belief. For example, if a worker is estimated by eight employers and the average
estimation is 20, the worker receives a wage of 40 · 20 points. Therefore, the worker
has two sources of income: the productivity and the employer belief (revised employer
belief). This provides the worker with an incentive to achieve comparable performance
in the timed character puzzle and the 5-minute work period.
2.2.2 Data
We conduct our experiment with university students in a western province of China.
We contacted students through their class supervisors and obtained their consent to par-
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Figure 2.3 Examples of Resumes by Treatments
TG TGE
Practice time: 18 Practice time: 20
Gender: Male Gender: Female
Worker’s self-evaluation: 12 Ethnicity: Han
Your previous evaluation: 15 Worker’s self-evaluation: 20
Your new evaluation: Your previous evaluation: 18
Your new evaluation:
TGEU TGPU
Practice time: 22 Practice time: 17
Gender: Male Gender: Female
Ethnicity: minority Origin of Province: Sichuan
Urban/Rural: Urban Urban/Rural: Rural
Worker’s self-evaluation: 15 Worker’s self-evaluation: 10
Your previous evaluation: 16 Your previous evaluation: 10
Your new evaluation: Your new evaluation:
ticipate in an experiment.2 Subjects are divided into 4 sessions. Each session lasted about
50 minutes and sessions were conducted back to back in order to reduce communication
between students about the nature of the experiment.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of subjects’ labor market characteristics. We
recruited 276 students from agricultural products, agronomy, Chinese medicinal herbs,
environment and resources, horticulture and plant protection majors. Participants are
all of similar ages as they are all freshmen. As many students are local and the province
is ethnic-diverse, the share of ethnic minorities among university students reflects the
population shares. The female ratio is lower than the national average which is about
48%. The urban ratio is also lower than the national average because the province is
a less developed one. The table also shows the average earnings of subjects from (1)
solving puzzles in the 5-minute work period, (2) worker wages averaged on employer
estimates, and (3) the employer’s earnings from evaluating workers. Combining these
2In Chinese universities, the department is divided into classes. Each class has a supervisor whose
duty is to oversee a student’s curriculum and extracurricular activities.
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earnings, the subjects received a payoff 22.1 Yuan ($3.4) in average during the course of
the experiment.3
2.3 Results
We first verify that self-confidence does not affect productivity. It does, however,
increase the employer belief when it is explicitly signalled to the employer.
2.3.1 What Determines the Worker’s Self-confidence?
Before proceeding to econometric analysis, we display the distribution of workers’ self-
confidence in Figure 2.4, of which the horizontal axis draws the difference between the
self-evaluation and the expected productivity. By construction, over-confident (under-
confident) workers are plotted to the right (left) side of 0. In general, the self-confidence
is distributed like a normal distribution, but the center seems to be at 1 instead of 0.
Close to 20% of workers believe that they can do 1 more puzzle than their expected
productivity. To the right, about 15% of workers are confident that they will do 2 more
puzzles than their expected productivity. To the left, about 12% of workers indicated a
self-evaluation equal to the expected productivity. Moreover, most of the self-evaluations
are within the range of 5 more and fewer puzzles than the expected productivity.
We then analyze what determines the worker’s self-confidence in the following equa-
tion:
ln(Self-confidence1j) = α + βXj + µj (2.1)
where Self-confidence1j is the ratio of worker j’s self-evaluation to his/her expected
productivity, and Xj is a vector of dummy variables for worker j’s labor market charac-
teristics: ethnicity, gender, urban/rural, and origin of province. By definition, worker j
is over-confident (under-confident) if Self-confidence1j is higher (lower) than 1.
3The opportunity cost of one hour for a university student, e.g. tutoring a school kid, is about 20
Yuan in the two provinces.
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of Workers’ Self-confidence
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We report the results in the first column of Table 2.2. As the coefficients suggest,
self-confidence is not determined by the worker’s identity characteristics. In the next
column, we add the log of the expected productivity, ln(300/Signal). Note that the
coefficient -0.26 does not mean that a worker who performs better in the practice puzzles
has lower self-confidence. It means that if the expected productivity is increased by 1%,
the worker’s self-evaluation will still increase, but by only 0.74%. Its minus sign implies,
however, that the workers’ over-confidence (under-confidence) is decreasing (increasing)
in the expected productivity.
When we add to the regression the actual productivity, which has no impact on self-
confidence, the impact of the expected productivity stays significant. However, workers
are less over-confident: 1% increase (decrease) in the expected productivity raises (re-
duces) the self-evaluation by 0.69%.
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2.3.2 What Determines Worker Productivity?
To check how the actual productivity is determined, we construct the following model:
ln(Productivityj) = δ + γXj + νj (2.2)
where Productivityj is worker j’s productivity, and Xj is the same vector of character-
istics in Equation 2.1.
Results are shown in the first column of Table 2.3. For the actual productivity, a
female performs 8% better than a male, while a urban person outperforms a rural person
by 11%. The difference between urban and rural becomes insignificant when we add
the control ln(300/Signal). The better performance of females, however, stays signif-
icant. The strongest predictor to worker productivity is how the worker performed in
the practice puzzle: a 1% increase in the expected productivity, (300/Signal), signifi-
cantly raises the productivity by 0.32%. The results stay very close when we include the
variable ln(Self-confidence1), which does not affect the actual productivity.
2.3.3 How Employers Make Estimates?
In order to see how employers estimate worker productivity, we look at the following
equation:
ln(Employer Belief ij) = η + θXj + ζ i + ij (2.3)
where Employer Belief ij is employer i’s belief on worker j’s productivity, Xj is the same
vector of characteristics in Equation 2.1, and ζ i is the employer fixed effect controlling
for employers’ individual characteristics.
In Table 2.4, the first four columns report the results for each of the four treatments,
respectively. The results suggest that regardless of the treatment, the most important
resume characteristic for estimating a worker is the signal. Increase of 1% in the expected
productivity increases the employer estimate by 0.28-0.39%.
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In the last column, we pool across all treatments and include treatment dummies.
The dummy variables are now with the value of 1 if the original value of 1 is observed,
and 0 otherwise. As no treatment has a significant effect on employer estimates, there
is no structural difference between the treatments. Results are consistent with the other
four columns.
2.3.4 Does Worker’s Self-confidence Change Employer Estimates?
We first check the impact of the worker’s self-confidence on employer estimates when it
is not signalled to the employer. To this purpose, we add the variable ln(Self-confidence1)
as a control in Equation 2.3 and report the results in Table 2.5.
As the coefficient is insignificant in every column, self-confidence does not matter for
employer estimation. This is a straightforward result because what the employers face
are silent resumes. In other words, there is no way that the employer can either explicitly
or implicitly observe the worker’s self-confidence.
Now we check how self-confidence changes employer estimation when it is explicitly
signalled to the employer. We first look at Figure 2.5 which draws the percentages of
employers who changed their estimates when observing the worker’s self-confidence. As
the graph suggests, about 60% of employers made a positive or negative change to their
estimates. The distribution looks close to a normal one as the positive side and the
negative side are balanced distributed.
To closely examine how employers revise their estimates, we construct the following
model:
ln(RevisedEmployer Belief ij) = κ+ ωXj + λi + υij (2.4)
where RevisedEmployer Belief ij is employer i’s revised belief on worker j’s productiv-
ity, Xj is the same vector of characteristics in Equation 2.1, and λi is the employer fixed
effect controlling for employers’ individual characteristics.
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Figure 2.5 Distribution of Differences of Employer Belief
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We report the results in Table 2.6. The coefficients of the variable ln(Self−confidence1)
reveal that for two workers with the same signal, the more confident worker receives a
higher wage. Specifically, signalling 1% higher self-evaluation to employers increase the
employer estimate by 0.14%-0.31%. Comparing with the impact of the signal, this im-
pact is not small: 1% difference in the signal can be compensated by about 1.5%-4%
change in the over-confidence (under-confidence).
In Table 2.7, we replace the identity characteristics and the expected productivity
with the employer’s previous estimate. The results suggest that even when the wage
decision has been made, workers still have the chance to raise his/her wage by signalling
higher self-confidence to the employer.
Finally, we combine the explanatory variables from Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 in Table
2.8. Even though we control for all labor market characteristics and the employer’s previ-
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ous estimate, the variable ln(Self−confidence1) remains significant in every treatment.
The signalling value of self-confidence is again confirmed.
2.3.5 Do Employers Benefit from Knowing Workers’ Self-confidence?
In this section, we study the impact of workers’ self-confidence on employer profits.
As introduced in the section of experimental design, an employer earns 150−10·|mistake|
points for each evaluated worker, where mistake is defined by the difference between the
worker’s actual productivity and the employer belief. To check the change of employer
profits from the first offer to the second offer, Table 2.9 displays a comparison of the two
profits. At the significance level of 5%, the profit from the second offer is significantly
higher than the profit from the first offer. Moreover, there is less variation of profit in the
second offer. The distributions of the two profits indicate that to a large degree of extent,
the difference between the two profits is due to their difference in the first quartile.
The statistics reveal that employers make more profit from revising their estimates
for worker productivity. To distinguish the impact of self-confidence from having the
chance of rethinking about the estimation, we construct to following equation:
Employer Profitij = ξ + piSecond Offeri + ρSelf-confidence2j + τ i + σij (2.5)
where Employer Profitij is the profit of employer i makes from evaluating worker j,
Second Offeri is a dummy variable with the value of 0 (1) if the profit is made from first
(second) offer, Self-confidence2j is the difference between worker j’s self-evaluation and
his/her expected productivity, and τ i is the employer fixed effect.
Table 2.10 reports the results. Except in treatment TG, employers make significantly
higher profits when having the second chance of thinking about their estimation. The
negative coefficient of the variable Self-confidence2 implies that employers make lower
profits from evaluating more confident workers. The impact is significant in treatments
TG and TGPU, and when pooled across all treatments. This is not a surprising result.
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We have seen from the previous section that worker self-confidence can easily affect
employer belief. But since the expected productivity is the only factor that matters
for predicting the worker’s actual productivity, higher self-confidence leads to larger
estimation mistakes.
2.3.6 Does Workers’ Self-confidence Improve the Quality of Employer Esti-
mation?
We adopt the methodology by Granger [44] and Mankiw and Shapiro [64] to evaluate
whether observing workers’ self-confidence improves the quality of employer estimation.
Consider the following model:
ln(Productivityj) = a+ bln(Employer Beliefi) + cXj + di + φij. (2.6)
If Employer Belief are good estimates of Productivity, their plots would look similar. We
then form the following hypotheses:
1. a=0;
2. b=1;
3. c=0.
The first two hypotheses state that the estimates are unbiased, because high quality of
estimation means that the plots of Employer Belief and Productivity would look similar.
The third hypothesis tests the efficiency of the estimates. Since good employer estimation
should have contained all useful information that can predict the actual productivity,
the coefficients of these information should be 0 once Employer Belief is controlled for.
Employers are rational if both unbiasedness and efficiency are satisfied.
Results are displayed in the odd number of columns in Table 2.11. The coefficients
suggest that all the hypotheses above can be rejected at significance level of 5%. There-
fore, the quality of the employer estimates can be easily improved.
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To see whether the quality has improved after workers’ self-confidence is observed,
we modify Equation 2.6 to the following one:
ln(Productivityj) = e + fln(Revised Employer Beliefi) + gln(Self-confidence1j)
+ hXj + ki + ψij. (2.7)
The even numbers of columns report the results. By comparing the coefficients c and
h, the efficiency of employer estimation did not improve. However, the unbiasedness did
improve, though not significantly. This can be seen by checking that f is closer to to its
null hypothesis value of 1 than b, and e is closer to 0 than a.
2.4 Conclusions
As identified by Benabou and Tirole [10], there are three values of demanding self-
confidence: the consumption value, the motivation value, and the signalling value. The
first two regard how one directly benefits from being self-confident. Our results provide
explicit evidence to the signalling value, which concerns about how to gain a utility from
convincing others that one has high ability. Indeed, as discussed by Burks et al. [19],
overconfidence is more likely to be induced by the desire to send positive signals to others
about one’s own skill.
Since it is shown that some social groups differ in self-confidence, our results can
help explain the income gap between different social groups. For example, as men are
shown to be more confident than women, our results suggest that men would earn more
in the labor market, just by signalling more self-confidence. We can also interact self-
confidence with ethnic minorities. We did not find any interaction in the current paper,
most likely because the location is a diverse province, with 40% of the population being
minorities. Thus minorities and Hans are equal in many social dimensions. It is likely,
however, to be different in non-diverse provinces, where minorities make up only a minor
part of the population. In that case, they might be different from Hans in some social
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev
Age 20.2 1.3
College major
—Agronomy 0.24 0.4
—Agricultural products 0.16 0.4
—Chinese medicinal herbs 0.11 0.3
—Environment and resources 0.17 0.4
—Horticulture 0.15 0.4
—Plant protection 0.16 0.4
Minority 0.4 0.5
Female 0.4 0.5
Urban 0.3 0.5
Points earned as the worker 611 190
from the 5-minute work period
Points earned as the worker 734 134
from employer evaluations
Points earned as the employer 956 472
dimensions, due to their very low representation in the population. It is then useful to
conduct the experiment in a non-diverse Chinese province, and examine the interaction
of self-confidence, ethnicity, and income.
We can also consider field experiments. Does self-confidence affect the wage in the
field? Some works have answered this question from a more general angle, the non-
cognitive skills. With our design, we can measure self-confidence in the lab, and look
at the wage in the field. The ideal subjects would be university students on the job
market. We will not be able to identify the specific value of self-confidence leading to
the wage differential though. It can be that a person feels happier by being confident
and thus performs better in the labor market. It is also possible that more confident
individuals are more motivated and are more capable when facing difficulties. Or just
like in the paper, more confident people signal more confidence, and hence convince
employers about the high ability.
54
Table 2.2 Determinants of Self-confidence
Dependent variable: ln(Self-confidence1)
(1) (2) (3)
Minority -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Female -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Urban 0.05 0.08 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ln(300/Signal) -0.26∗∗ -0.31∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
ln(Productivity) 0.13
(0.08)
N 270 270 269
R2 0.06 0.13 0.14
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 2.3 Determinants of Productivity
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
(1) (2) (3)
Minority -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Female 0.08∗ 0.09∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban 0.11∗ 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln(300/Signal) 0.32∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
ln(Self-confidence1) 0.08
(0.05)
N 275 272 269
R2 0.13 0.26 0.27
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 2.4 Determinants of Employer Belief
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
Minority -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Female 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Urban 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.08∗∗ 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(300/Signal) 0.39∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
TGE -0.02
(0.07)
TGEU -0.00
(0.05)
TGPU 0.02
(0.07)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.25
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 2.5 Does Worker Self-confidence Affect
Employer Belief?
Dependent variable: ln(Employer Belief)
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
Minority -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Female 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Urban -0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.07∗∗ 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(300/Signal) 0.40∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(Self-confidence1) 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
TGE -0.02
(0.07)
TGEU -0.00
(0.06)
TGPU 0.02
(0.07)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.25
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 2.6 Does Worker Self-confidence Affect
Revision of Employer Belief?
Dependent variable: ln(Revised Employer Belief)
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
Minority 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female -0.00 -0.04∗ -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Urban -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(300/Signal) 0.51∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(Self-confidence1) 0.17∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
TGE -0.00
(0.04)
TGEU -0.03
(0.04)
TGPU 0.01
(0.04)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.46 0.58 0.39 0.51 0.44
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 2.7 Does Worker Self-confidence Affect
Revision of Employer Belief?
Dependent variable: ln(Revised Employer Belief)
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
ln(Belief) 0.80∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.68∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(Self-confidence1) 0.07∗∗ 0.04 0.13∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
TGE 0.02
(0.03)
TGEU -0.03
(0.03)
TGPU -0.01
(0.03)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.61 0.31 0.58 0.53 0.52
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
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Table 2.8 Does Worker Self-confidence Affect
Revision of Employer Belief?
Dependent variable: ln(Revised Employer Belief)
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
Minority 0.03∗ 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Urban -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(Employer Belief) 0.61∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
ln(300/Signal) 0.26∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(Self-confidence1) 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
TGE 0.01
(0.03)
TGEU -0.03
(0.02)
TGPU -0.00
(0.03)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.65
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
Table 2.9 Comparison of Employer Profits From
Two Offers
Mean Std.Error Std.Dev P25 P50 P100
Profit from first offer 913 26 427 840 1020 1140
Profit from second offer 1002 14 229 930 1060 1150
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Table 2.10 Does Worker Self-confidence Raise
Employer Profit?
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
TG TGE TGEU TGPU All
Second Offer 4.14 17.09∗∗ 9.70∗∗ 10.11∗∗ 10.08∗∗
(2.92) (3.62) (1.79) (2.85) (1.28)
Self-confidence2 -0.92∗ -0.10 -0.61∗∗ -0.53 -0.58∗∗
(0.40) (0.50) (0.20) (0.34) (0.15)
TGE -4.45
(6.48)
TGEU -0.79
(5.3)
TGPU 2.29
(6.56)
N 48 47 137 45 277
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
61
T
ab
le
2.
11
R
at
io
n
al
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
on
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
ln
(P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
) T
G
T
G
P
U
T
G
E
T
G
E
U
A
ll
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
ln
(E
m
p
lo
ye
r
B
el
ie
f)
0
.2
5
∗∗
0.
21
∗∗
0.
18
∗∗
0.
21
∗∗
0.
1
0∗
∗
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
1)
ln
(R
ev
is
ed
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
B
el
ie
f)
0
.3
2
∗∗
0.
40
∗∗
0.
28
∗∗
0.
3
2∗
∗
0
.2
2∗
∗
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
2
)
ln
(S
el
f-
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
1
)
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
4
0.
00
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
2
)
M
in
o
ri
ty
0.
03
0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
5
∗∗
-0
.0
6∗
∗
0
.0
2
0
.0
2
-0
.0
7∗
∗
-0
.0
5
∗∗
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
1
)
F
em
al
e
0
.1
3
∗∗
0.
1
3∗
∗
0.
12
∗∗
0.
13
∗∗
0.
08
∗∗
0.
08
∗∗
0.
0
6∗
0
.0
6∗
0.
0
7∗
∗
0
.0
7∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1)
U
rb
an
0
.0
8
∗
0.
07
∗
0.
18
∗∗
0.
15
∗∗
0.
06
∗∗
0.
05
∗∗
0.
1
0∗
∗
0
.1
1∗
∗
0
.1
1∗
∗
0.
1
2∗
∗
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
1
)
T
G
E
0.
0
4
0
.0
1
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2)
T
G
E
U
-0
.0
0
0.
0
1
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2)
T
G
P
U
0
.3
1
0.
2
9
(0
.1
7)
(0
.1
6
)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
10
∗∗
1.
9
0∗
∗
2.
15
∗∗
1.
64
∗∗
2.
08
∗∗
1.
82
∗∗
2.
26
∗∗
1.
9
7∗
∗
2.
3
8∗
∗
2
.0
1∗
∗
(0
.2
2)
(0
.2
2)
(0
.2
2)
(0
.2
1)
(0
.1
3)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.2
1)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5)
N
48
48
47
47
13
7
13
7
14
5
4
5
2
77
27
7
R
2
0
.1
8
0
.2
1
0.
28
0.
34
0.
16
0.
19
0
.2
3
0
.2
8
0.
0
7
0
.1
4
a.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
ls
of
5%
an
d
1%
ar
e
d
en
ot
ed
b
y
*
an
d
**
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
b
.
P
ro
v
in
ce
of
or
ig
in
d
u
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
co
lu
m
n
s.
62
CHAPTER 3. EMPLOYER DEMAND FOR WORKER
CHARACTERISTICS IN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR
MARKETS
We use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to study the ex ante em-
ployer demand for worker characteristics. In our experimental labor market, “employers”
estimate productivity of “workers” based on worker characteristics. In some treatments,
we provide employers with worker resumes containing a subset of information on expected
productivity, ethnicity, gender, and urban/rural characteristics. In another treatment, a
worker characteristic is displayed on the resume if the employer claims a willing to pay
(WTP) higher than or equal to a randomly determined price. The ex ante demand for
a characteristic is determined by the WTP for it. We find the ex ante demand for the
expected productivity is correctly calibrated to be the highest, while other characteris-
tics are overdemanded. We then compare the ex ante demand with the ex post demand,
which is determined by a characteristic’s explaining strength in employer estimation. We
find that a combination of both mechanisms gives the best labor market outcome. That
is, the ex post demand of employers who buy worker characteristics is the most accurate
demand.
3.1 Introduction
The labor market is a platform where job applicants provide employers with a set of
relevant worker characteristics based on which the hiring and wage decisions are made.
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However, job applicants are usually offered with restricted time length or physical space
to present these characteristics. For instance, this question of “can you tell us about
yourself in 5 minutes?” is known to be common during job interviews. The dilemma of the
job applicant who confronts such limitations is, from the set of available characteristics,
what are the most useful ones to present to the employer. This question becomes even
more important when presenting irrelevant characteristics can possibly hurt the outcome.
In Chapter 1 for example, employers at Non-diverse discriminate against ethnic minorities
even though ethnicity is not related to worker productivity. Hence a very important but
usually puzzling question in the labor market is: what information is really important
for employers?
When the hiring or the wage decision is known, we can answer this question by
studying the outcome with an equation that has worker characteristics as the explana-
tory variables. In experimental labor markets, this can be done using the framework
in Chapter 1. In that labor market, the “employer” estimates the productivity of the
“worker” based on worker characteristics. The ex post employer demand for a worker
characteristic is determined by how it affects employer estimation. In other words, if
employer estimation is the dependent variable and worker characteristics are the ex-
planatory variables, then the ex post demand for a characteristic is determined by its
coefficient in the regression equation.
Alternatively, we propose an experimental labor market to reveal employer demand
for worker characteristics ex ante. It is the same labor market where employers estimate
worker productivity. It is different, however, that instead of being assigned to different
worker resumes, employers buy worker characteristics in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) market. To do so, they claim a willingness to pay (WTP) for a specific worker
characteristic. If the WTP is higher than or equal to a randomly determined price, then
this characteristic is bought by the employer and is displayed on the worker’s resume.
Otherwise it is not displayed to the employer. The ex ante demand for a characteristic
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is determined by the magnitude of the WTP.
We compare the two experimental labor markets by analyzing the true values, the ex
ante demand, and the ex post demand for the worker characteristics. We find that the ex
ante demand for the expected productivity is the highest among all characteristics. This
is justified by its highest explaining power to the actual productivity. However, employers
systematically overbid for other three characteristics. We attribute this overbidding
behavior to curiosity satisfaction. In other words, employers spend money to know more
about the worker just to satisfy their curiosity. We further find that a combination
of both markets gives the best labor market outcome. That is, relative to employers
who are given worker characteristics for free, employers who are asked to buy worker
characteristics display the most accurate ex post demand. Two reasons can account
for this result. First, employers who buy worker characteristics have two chances of
thinking about how to use the characteristics in productivity estimation. Second, a
costly characteristic is supposed to be used more carefully than a free one.
Our paper is part of a growing experimental labor market literature. The framework
is similar to Chapter 1 that studies how stereotype is related with diversity by comparing
the belief of employers in a diverse and a non-diverse community about minorities. It is
also related to Mobius and Rosenblat [68] who study the origins of the “beauty premium”.
Bertrand and Mullainathan [12] use a field experiment to study racial discrimination in
the U.S. labor market. They construct synthetic resumes and respond to help-wanted
advertisements in Boston and Chicago newspapers. Resumes are randomly assigned
typical white or African-American names. They find that resumes with white names
receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. The results provide explicit evidence
for racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market. In the Chinese labor market, Maurer-
Fazio [65] uses a similar approach and finds that Han Chinese are much more likely
to receive a callback from jobs posted on internet. The BDM mechanism used in this
paper has been extensively applied in studying reservation prices for products like petrol
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(Bohm [14]), goods with induced values (Irwin et al. [53], Keller et al. [56]), and food
safety (Rozan [77]). Another commonly used demand revealing mechanism is the second
price auction. For example, it has been used to study food safety (Buzby et al. [20]
and Hayes et al. [47]) and Europeans’ willingness to pay for U.S. beef (Alfnes [3]). The
random n-th price auction is a combination of the BDM mechanism and the second price
auction in which the winner pays the n-th bidder’s price. Huffman et al. [51]) have used
this mechanism to study consumers’ willingness to pay for genetically modified food.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental
design, the BDM mechanism, and data collection process. Section 3 describes the analysis
strategy. Experimental results are reported in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Experiment
3.2.1 Experimental Design
The experimental design is based on the framework of Chapter 1 in which employers
set wages of workers who do a real effort task. The task is the same character puzzles
from Chapter 1 (shown in Figure 3.1). Each puzzle shows two quadratic arrays of 7 times
7 characters of Latin alphabets. The two arrays are identical except for two random
position where the characters differ. Workers have to find these two locations and click
them with their mouse.
In the first step as the worker, each subject is given two warm-up character puzzles.
Afterwards, the worker is asked to solve one practice character puzzle. The time that
takes the worker to complete the practice character puzzle, which we will refer from
now on as the “signal”, is recorded by the experimenter. The signal and other personal
information on gender, urban/rural status, ethnicity, and province of origin, are used
to construct the worker’s “resume”. In the last step, the worker has a 5-minute work
period to solve as many puzzles as possible and is rewarded with 40 points for each solved
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Figure 3.1 Character Puzzle
puzzle.1 The numbers of puzzles that the worker completes in the 5 minutes are referred
from now on as the worker’s “productivity”. The sequence of the puzzles in each step are
identical for every subject, which means that the subjects are solving the same puzzles
appearing in the same order.
The subjects are then switched to the employer who estimates worker productivity.
The estimated productivity is referred from now on as the “employer belief” on a worker.
Each employer evaluates 10 other randomly selected workers and earns 150 points for
each evaluated resume. However, if the employer belief is different from a worker’s
productivity by x puzzles, the earnings are reduced by 10 · x points. For example, if a
worker solved 20 puzzles in the 5 minutes and the employer’s estimate is 18, the employer
receives 150− 10 · |20− 18| = 130 points.
The worker receives a wage of 40 points per average employer belief. For example, if
a worker is estimated by 8 employers and the average employer belief is 20, the worker
receives a wage of 40 · 20 points. Therefore, the worker has two sources of income: the
productivity and the employer belief. This provides the worker with an incentive to
1The experimental points are later converted to cash at a rate of 100 points = 1 Yuan ' $0.16.
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achieve comparable performance in the timed character puzzle and the 5-minute work
period.
Employers are randomly assigned to one out of five resume treatments. In four of
them, the treatment determines how a worker’s resume is displayed to the employer.
This is identical to the experimental design in Chapter 1 except that the TGPU resume
is replace by the TGU one. Examples of each type of resume are given in Figure 3.2.
TG: The employer sees the signal (“Practice time” on the example resume) and gender.
TGE: The employer sees ethnicity in addition to TG.
TGEU: The employer sees urban/rural in addition of TGE.
TGU: The employer sees urban/rural in addition to TG.
Figure 3.2 Examples of Resumes in Control Experiment
TG TGE
Practice time: 18 Practice time: 20
Gender: male Gender: female
Evaluation: Ethnicity: Han
Evaluation:
TGEU TGU
Practice time: 22 Practice time: 17
Gender: male Gender: female
Ethnicity: minority Urban/Rural: Rural
Urban/Rural: Urban Evaluation:
Evaluation:
Some employers are assigned to the WTP treatment where they can buy worker
characteristics. In this treatment, an employer is given 150 points for every estimated
worker, and is asked to claim a WTP for each of the four worker characteristics: signal,
ethnicity, gender, urban/rural, in the following question.
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WTP for practice time
For seeing each worker’s practice time, the highest price you are willing to pay is
credits.
WTP for ethnicity
There are x Han workers, y Tibetan workers, z Mongolian workers, ... For seeing
each worker’s ethnicity, the highest price you are willing to pay is credits.
WTP for gender
There are x male workers and y female workers. For seeing each worker’s gender,
the highest price you are willing to pay is credits.
WTP for urban/rural
There are x urban workers and y rural workers. For seeing each worker’s ur-
ban/rural status, the highest price you are willing to pay is credits.
When the decisions are made, three characteristics are randomly chosen by the com-
puter to be displayed to the employer for free. The remaining one characteristic is
hidden and a price p between 0 and 150 points is randomly determined for it. If the
corresponding WTP is higher than or equal to p, then the employer pays p and the hid-
den information is displayed. Otherwise the employer keeps 150 points and sees the free
characteristics. Figure 3.3 is an example in which the ethnicity characteristic is chosen
to be hidden. The left side resume has no information on the worker’s ethnicity because
WTP is lower than p but the right side one does show that the worker is Han because
WTP is higher than or equal to p.
3.2.2 The BDM Mechanism in Revealing True WTP
The BDM mechanism guarantees that revealing true WTPs is the dominant strategy
for employers. To see why, consider an employer with the true WTP w for a certain
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Figure 3.3 When ethnicity is chosen to be hidden
(If WTP ethnicity < p) (If WTP ethnicity ≥ p)
Practice time: 18 Practice time: 20
Gender: male Gender: female
Urban/Rural: urban Urban/Rural: rural
Evaluation: Ethnicity: Han
Evaluation:
characteristic. Suppose that the employer claims a WTP w′ higher than w. If the
randomly determined price p falls between w and w′, then the employers pays p. But
since the maximum price the employer is willing to pay is w, he/she loses (p−w). Hence
the employer will not claim a WTP higher than w. Now suppose that the employer
claims a WTP w′′ lower than w. If p falls between w′′ and w, the characteristic will not
be displayed. But the employer is willing to see the characteristic at price p because
he/she can gain w − p. Hence the employer will increase the claim until w′′ = w.
Therefore, the employer will always claim a WTP equals the true WTP w.
3.2.3 Data
The data collection process is similar to that in Chapter 1. We conduct our ex-
periment with students at Changan University, China. The university is located in
the province Shaanxi where fewer than 1% of the population are members of ethnic
minorities. We contacted students through their class supervisors and obtained their
consent to participate in the experiment. As Table 3.1 shows, the students are from
Math, Engineering, and Computer Sciences majors. A total of 284 students are re-
cruited, and 145 students are assigned to treatment WTP Experiment and 139 students
are assigned to other treatments. The table reports the mean and standard deviations
statistics of demographic characteristics like ethnicity, gender, urban/rural, local/non-
local, minority/non-minority province. It also shows the average earnings of subjects
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from (1) solving puzzles in the 5-minute work period, (2) worker wages averaged on
employer estimates, (3) the employer’s earnings from evaluating workers, and (4) the
employer’s earnings from buying worker characteristics. Combined earnings are 33 Yuan
for WTP Experiment participants and 23 Yuan for Control Experiment participants.2
3.3 Results
3.3.1 True Values of Worker Characteristics
The true value of a characteristic is determined by its strength in explaining worker
productivity, which can be determined in the following equation:
ln(Productivityij) = α + βXj + ij (3.1)
where Productivityj worker j’s productivity,Xj is a vector of worker j’s characteristics:
300/Signal, Minority, Female, Urban. The variable 300/Signal is the signal converted
to equivalent numbers of puzzles in 5 minutes. The other three are dummy variables
with the value of 1 if the worker is a minority, female, urban person, respectively, and 0
otherwise.
Table 3.3 reports the results in the first column. The signal characteristic is a
very important explanatory factor to worker productivity. A one percent increase in
(300/Signal) significantly raises worker productivity by 0.16 percent. The urban/rural
characteristic is also a good factor in explaining worker productivity. A change from
rural to urban increases the productivity by 8%. Note that from the maximum feasible
productivity of 50 puzzles, we can infer that the maximum value for urban/rural charac-
teristic is 10 credits. To see this, suppose an employers see a worker resume with signal
but without urban/rural. Based on the signal, the employer gives an estimate of x puz-
zles. Knowing the urban/rural characteristic would change the estimation by 8%, which
2The opportunity cost of one hour for a university student, e.g. tutoring a school kid, is about 20
Yuan in the two provinces.
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is x · 8% puzzles. Since the maximum the x can be is 50, the estimate could change by 4
puzzles at most. But because wrong estimation is punished by 10 credits for each unit of
deviation, the employer will not spend more than 40 credits on knowing the urban/rural
characteristic. Similarly, because the mean worker productivity is 16 puzzles, we can
also infer that the mean value of the urban/rural characteristic is 13 credits. The other
two characteristic, ethnicity and gender, have no impact on productivity and hence have
the value of 0. Let V denote the true value of a characteristic, we can summarize the
findings as follows:
1. Signal has the highest value among all characteristics;
2. Max(V urban/rural) = 40 credits;
3. Mean(V urban/rural) = 13 credits;
3. V ethnicity = 0 credit;
4. V gender = 0 credit.
3.3.2 Ex Ante Demand for Worker Characteristics
The ex ante demand for a characteristic is determined by the WTP for it. We
investigate the WTPs by looking at the distributions as well as performing statistical
tests for equal means and variances. Figure 3.4 draws the distribution of WTP for
ethnicity. Taking the WTP of 50 as the midpoint, the graph is inclining to the left side
toward 0. The highest percentage, 15%, of employers claimed a WTP of 0. As indicated
on the graph, half of employer claimed a WTP below 20. To be in the upper quartile,
the WTP is above 45 which is about one third of the total endowment. The distribution
shapes of WTPs for gender and urban/rural are similar to WTP for ethnicity. Highest
percentages of employers happen when WTP is 0. Half of employers are not willing to
pay a price above 20. In the contrary, the graph of WTP for signal is more balanced
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on the two sides of 50, which is claimed by the highest percentage of employers. The
median WTP of 20 for ethnicity, gender and urban/rural is the lower quartile in the
distribution of WTP for signal. Moreover, the median of 40 is twice of other three
WTPs. In particular, it is close to the 75th percentile of the other three.
Figure 3.4 WTP for Ethnicity
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Table 3.2 reports the specific statistics of means and variances. The Bartlett’s test
suggests that the four WTPs have equal variances but the F test rejects the null hypoth-
esis of equal means. By comparing the means and the 95% confidence intervals, WTPs
for the ethnicity, gender, and urban/rural characteristics are not significantly different
from each other. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected because that WTP for
signal is significantly higher than other three WTPs.
According to these figures and statistics, we have the following findings. First, the
WTP for signal, 43 credit, is the highest among all characteristics. Moreover, it is
about 50% higher than the other three characteristics. Second, there is systematically
overbidding for the other three characteristics. Employer even spend a significant amount
of money on knowing ethnicity and gender, which are valued at 0 credit. We explain
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Figure 3.5 WTP for Gender
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this over-bidding behavior by curiosity satisfaction. In other words, employers want to
know about the worker to satisfy their curiosity. The average spending on this curiosity
is about 30 credits, which is one fifth of the total endowment.
3.3.3 Ex Post Demand for Worker Characteristics
The ex post demand for worker characteristics can be examined in the following
equation:
ln(Employer Belief ij) = α + βXj + υij (3.2)
where Employer Belief ij is employer i’s estimate on worker j’s productivity, and Xj is
the same vector of worker j’s characteristics in Equation (1).
We report the results for each of the five treatments in the last four columns of Table
3.3. For every treatment, the signal is an important characteristic to estimate worker
productivity. If a worker performs one percent better in the converted timed character
puzzle, employers give a 0.15-0.43 percent higher estimate to the productivity. In par-
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Figure 3.6 WTP for Urban/Rural
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ticular, its impact on employer estimation is closer to its impact on actual productivity
of 0.16, in treatments WTP, TG, and TGE. This suggests that the ex post demand for
signal is more accurate in these three treatments.
The urban/rural characteristic is significant only in treatment WTP. The magnitude
of the coefficient, 0.05, is close to its impact on actual productivity of 0.08. This implies
that urban/rural is demanded accurately only in treatment WTP. Using the same logic
before, we can infer that the maximum and mean values of the urban/rural characteristic
in the ex post demand is 25 and 10 credits, respectively. Let V˜ denote the value of a
characteristic in the ex post demand, we can summarize the findings as follows.
For treatment WTP:
1. Signal has the highest value among all characteristics;
2. max(V˜ urban/rural) = 25 credits; (in treatment WTP)
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Figure 3.7 WTP for Signal
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3. mean(V˜ urban/rural) = 10 credits; (in treatment WTP)
4. V˜ ethnicity = 0 credit;
5. V˜ gender = 0 credit.
For treatment TG:
1. Signal has the highest value among all characteristics;
2. V˜ urban/rural = 0 credit;
3. V˜ ethnicity = 0 credit;
4. V˜ gender = 0 credit.
3.3.4 Comparing the Two Mechanisms
In terms of closeness to the true values, a combination of both mechanisms gives the
best labor market outcome. In other words, the ex post demand of employers who buy
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worker characteristics is the most accurate one.
The results make sense for two reasons. First, relative to employers who are given
characteristics for free, employers in treatment WTP are using the information they have
spent money on. Hence they are likely to be more careful in using worker characteristics
for the estimation. Second, the WTP treatment provides employer with two chances of
thinking about how to use the characteristics.
3.3.5 Employer Profit
In this section, we examine the relationship between the WTPs and the employers’
profits. The profit that an employer makes from evaluating a worker is defined before as
150− 10 · |mistake| points, where mistake is the difference between the worker’s actual
productivity and the employer belief. Consider the following equation:
Employer Profitij = ζ + ηXj + θWTP i + νij (3.3)
where Employer Profitij is the profit that employer i makes from evaluating worker j,
Xj is a vector of worker j’s characteristic dummies: minority, female, rural, province of
origin.
Tables 3.4 reports the results. As the coefficients of the WTPs are not significant, it is
suggested that the WTPs are not associated with the employers’ profits from evaluating
workers.
3.3.6 The Quality of Employer Estimation
We adopt the methodology by Granger [44] and Mankiw and Shapiro [64] to evaluate
the quality of employer estimation. Specifically, we examine whether the employers’
estimation accuracy is associated with their WTP. Consider the following model:
ln(Productivityj) = a+ bln(Employer Beliefi) + cXj + dWTPi + φij, (3.4)
and the following hypotheses:
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1. a=0;
2. b=1;
3. c=0 and d=0.
The first two hypotheses state that the estimates are unbiased, because high quality of
estimation means that the plots of Employer Belief and Productivity would look similar.
The third hypothesis tests the efficiency of the estimates. Since good employer estimation
should have contained all useful information that can predict the actual productivity,
the coefficients of these information should be 0 once Employer Belief is controlled for.
Employers are rational if both unbiasedness and efficiency are satisfied.
Results are displayed in Table 3.5. The coefficients suggest that all the hypotheses
above can be rejected at significance level of 5%. Therefore, the quality of the employer
estimates can be easily improved.
3.4 Conclusion
We propose a methodology that measures the ex ante employer demand for worker
characteristics, and compare it with the ex post demand. We find that the ex post
demand of employers who buy worker characteristics is the most accurate one.
Our methodology can serve as an alternative to measure labor market discrimination.
The wage differentials in the ex post demand would be then proportional to the WTP
differentials in our mechanism.
As evidence suggests that irrelevant information can hurt the labor market outcome,
we can also apply the mechanism to avoid the labor market being affected by noisy
factors. In that case, if it is costly to reveal worker characteristics, employers would not
be willing to pay for something not really related to the worker’s productivity.
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Table 3.2 WTP by Worker Characteristics
Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval
Signal 43 3 (37, 49)
Ethnicity 28 3 (22, 34)
Gender 30 3 (24, 36)
Urban/Rural 29 3 (24, 35)
F test for equal means: P=0.0007
Bartlett’s test for equal variances: P=0.99
Table 3.3 Regression Results
Dependent variable Productivity ln(Employer Belief)
Treatment WTP TG TGU TGE TGEU
(x.1) (x.1) (x.2) (x.3) (x.4) (x.5)
ln(300/Signal) 0.16∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Minority 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.08
(0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Female 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Urban 0.08∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
N 247 119 21 19 62 21
R2 0.2 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.36
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respec-
tively.
b. In Column (2), the explanatory variables are observed ones, which
are equal to the original value of 1 if observed, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.4 Profit Regression
Dependent variable: Employer Profit
Minority -6.92
(3.74)
Female -1.84
(3.98)
Urban -8.08
(3.46)
WTP signal -0.77
(0.35)
WTP ethnicity -1.23
(0.63)
WTP gender -0.62
(0.63)
WTP urban/rural -0.76
(0.67)
N 116
R2 0.01
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respec-
tively.
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Table 3.5 Rational Expectation Regression
Dependent variable: ln(Productivity)
ln(Employer Belief) 0.02
(0.02)
Minority -0.01
(0.02)
Female 0.07∗∗
(0.02)
Urban 0.12∗∗
(0.02)
WTP signal 0.00
(0.00)
WTP ethnicity -0.00
(0.00)
WTP gender 0.00
(0.00)
WTP urban/rural -0.00
(0.00)
Constant 2.72∗∗
(0.05)
N 116
R2 0.05
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respec-
tively.
82
CHAPTER 4. INDIRECT CONTACT AND SOCIAL
COOPERATION
Intergroup contact is the key to improving intergroup relationship and reducing in-
tergroup bias. Recent literature has demonstrated its impact on various settings of
economics like cooperation, trust, and altruism. However, intergroup contact is often
limited by scarce resources and availability of the involved groups. Indirect contact pro-
vides solutions to these limitations. We study how intergroup cooperation is increased
by simply observing in-group members being in contact with out-group members. Our
subject pool consists of students recruited from two different college majors at a Chinese
university. In our control treatment, a student is matched with someone from the other
major in a two-player public goods game. In a second treatment, the game players watch
intergroup contact prior to the public goods game. We find that subsequent contribution
to the public goods is significantly higher compared to the control treatment. To dis-
tinguish intergroup contact effect from simply putting subjects in a cooperative mood,
the game players in a third treatment watch random contact. The results show that it
is important to have in-group members in the contact.
4.1 Introduction
Intergroup contact is shown to be the key to improving intergroup relationships and
reducing prejudice against out-group members (Allport [4] and Pettigrew and Tropp
[75]). Its impact on economic settings like trust (Fiedler and Haruvy [37]), cooperation
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(Eckel and Grossman [33]), reciprocity and altruism (Buchan et al. [18]) has been studied
extensively. For example, Eckel and Grossman [33] show that random individuals coop-
erate more after interacting with each other. However, most of the works have focused on
direct interactions of which the feasibility may be restricted in many cases. In the case
of inter-racial/ethnic interactions, they are often limited by the shortage of the minority
population. Likewise, contact between domestics and immigrants is usually blocked by
residential, educational, and occupational segregation. Abundant financial and other re-
sources are also required for direct intergroup contact. International cooperation is one
of the primary goals of international agencies like the United Nations. Yet, because of
the physical distance, having every international citizen involved in direct interactions is
very costly, if not impossible.
Indirect intergroup contact, defined as learning, observing, and imagining in-group
members in contact with out-group members, provides us with a solution to these lim-
itations. These three types of indirect contact are shown to be effective in improving
intergroup relationship and reducing intergroup prejudice. In the pioneer work of Wright
et al. [94], two groups of individuals watch an in-group member interacting with an out-
group member in a puzzle task. When the interaction process is viewed as friendly,
the observers expressed lower in-group-out-group bias in a subsequent survey. Liebkind
and McAlister [60] conduct distribution, reading, and discussion of stories of inter-ethnic
friendship in Finnish middle schools. They find that compared to the control group, stu-
dents exhibited improved attitudes toward all ethnic minorities. In an ethnically diverse
island of Cyprus, Husnu and Crisp [52] asked Turkish Crypiot and Greek Crypiot sub-
jects to imagine contact with someone from the other group. This imagination process
increased subjects’ intentions to engage in future contact with the out-group members.
According to Pettigrew and Tropp [75] and Pettigrew et al. [76], there are two
powerful features of the indirect contact. First, the effect from the contact of an in-
group member with an out-group member will spill over to that out-group as a whole.
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In economics, this feature implies resource savings. In the example of international
cooperation, diplomatic activities with representatives from a foreign nation that are
watched, learned, and discussed by domestic citizens can build a positive image and
friendship with all citizens from that foreign nation. Second, although the theory was
originally developed for ethnic and racial groups, it can be applied to an extensive range
of social groups, and it is universal. This feature is particularly useful in managing
different diversities. Indirect contact provides a uniform solution to reduce intergroup
bias for these different diversities.
In the present work, we demonstrate that intergroup cooperation can be increased by
observing in-group members interacting with out-group members as an example of how
indirect contact can improve intergroup relationship, and in turn influence economic
behavior. Subjects in our experiment play a two player public goods game with out-
group members. In the control treatment, two students from different college majors
are matched in the game. In the second treatment, subjects watch intergroup contact
prior to the public goods game. To this purpose, a puzzle-solving team is formed by a
classmate of one player and a classmate of the other player. The players are asked to
watch the puzzle-solving team working together to solve a jigsaw puzzle. To distinguish
the effect of indirect intergroup contact from simply being emotionally cooperative due
to the jigsaw puzzle, players in the third treatment watch random contact, where the
puzzle-solving team consists of two random students.
We find that subjects who watched intergroup contact contribute about eight of the
ten endowment credits in the public fund, while subjects in the control treatment con-
tribute only six and half credits. In terms of percentages increased, the former contribute
25%-30% more than the latter. On the other hand, the impact of watching random con-
tact on increasing public contribution is limited and significantly lower than watching
intergroup contact. The findings suggest that having in-group members in the contact
is important.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous studies
on direct and indirect intergroup contact in both psychology and economics literature.
Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Results are reported in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
In this chapter, we review works related to intergroup relationship, from direct contact
to indirect contact, and from psychology to economics.
4.2.1 Direct Contact and Intergroup Relations (Psychology)
The literature on intergroup relations is so enormous that we may need a handbook
to cover it. Likewise, there are more than 600 studies on intergroup contact (Pettigrew
[76]) which makes it impossible to cover every one in this study. We present here the
most classical and representative examples.
We begin the introduction to the development of intergroup relationship with Adorno
et al’s work, The Authoritarian Personality [1]. The authors claim that prejudice and
discrimination against the out-group evolves from motivational sequences of interpersonal
interactions. In the example of Hogg and Abrams [50], children who have overly harsh
and restrictive parents are usually required to follow and execute strict convention, duty,
rules and authority. When the emotions are repressed, an out-group with lower status
is selected as an ideal target to express these repressed parts of personality. These
expressions are often aggressive as the depressed emotions are mostly with aggression.
Another approach is coined by Campbell [24] as the Realistic Group Conflict Theory,
where intergroup conflict is driven by real conflict of intergroup interests. In the well-
known Robers Cave experiment of Sherif [84], 22 boys who never met each other before
and participated in a summer camp in the Robbers Cave State Park, Oklahoma were
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separated into two groups. The two groups were assigned identity building activities
within the group. Afterwards, the boys were brought together in competitive activates
with prizes given to the winners. Intergroup tension, hostility, and aggressive actions
were found in the process of the competition.
An approach that is widely studied and applied today in psychological and economic
research is the “minimal group paradigm ”(Tajfel [86]). The theory states that any arbi-
trary distinction is sufficient to trigger intergroup bias. In Tajfel et al.’s experiment [87],
subjects showed in-group-out-group bias following categorization according to underesti-
mation or overestimation of the number of dots on the screen, or preference to paintings
by Klee or Kandinsky. This pattern of behavior persists, even when the random division
process was explicitly told to the subjects (Billig and Tajfel [13]).
The first work that proposed the contact theory is Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice
[4]. Since then, the vast amount of studies have shown that putting groups in direct
contact is the most efficient way to reduce intergroup bias. Allport characterized four
conditions in which the contact would work effectively: equal status of the groups in the
situation, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and authority support. Pettigrew et
al. [75], in a meta-analysis, indicate that the “contact effects typically generalize to the
entire outgroup, and they emerge across a broad range of outgroup targets and contact
settings”. It is further found that the contact effect generalizes even to out-groups not
involved, and it is universal (Pettigrew [76]).
4.2.2 Direct Contact and Intergroup Relationship (Economics)
Intergroup bias has been studied extensively in economics. In cooperative behaviors,
for example, Solow and Kirkwood [85] compare people with pre-existing group affiliations
to randomly selected ones, and find that the former cooperate more with each other in
public goods experiments. Ruﬄe and Sosis [78] find that in Israeli society, Kibbutz
residents are more likely to cooperate with other Kibbutz residents, than to cooperate
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with city residents. Social norm is also affected by intergroup bias. It is shown that when
individuals act as a judge who punishes people violating the norm, they put a heavier
punishment on those who belong to the out-group (Bernhard, Fehr and Fischbacher [11]
and Goette, Huffman, and Meier [42]). In altruism, Ben-Ner et al. [9] showed that the
intergroup bias exists in a wide range of social identities, from family to music preference,
religion to sports-team loyalty, and kinship to political views. Yan Chen and Sherry Xin
Li [27] generalized the different behaviors based on group identity into social preference
that include charity, envy, norm enforcement and efficiency.
The different cooperative behavior might be a mixed consequence of group member-
ship with culture, social norms and so on. Goette, Huffman, Meier [42] use random
assignment from the Swiss army to attribute the higher cooperation toward in-group
members to group membership. To a similar purpose, Charness et.al [25] argue that
when an audience is present, a person’s behavior toward in-group members and out-
group members diverges further as the group affiliation to the audience increases.
Following these works that have documented intergroup bias, researchers started
looking for ways to overcome it. Building a common identity is shown to be useful. Eckel
and Grossman [33] show that cooperation between random individuals can be raised by
building a common identity between them. Moreover, the cooperation level increases as
the identity-building activities are intensified. Roy Chen and Yan Chen [26] find that
building a common identity with communication between random people can help the
equilibrium identification in multi-equilibria games. Buchan et al. [18] demonstrated
that even irrelevant communication has a powerful influence on participants’ behavior.
In a novel design of Fiedler and Haruvy [37], participants interact through a virtual world
where social distance is varied but social identity is kept private. This increases both
the amount sent and the percentage returned in the trust games, relative to the control
group.
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4.2.3 Indirect Contact and Intergroup Relationships (Psychology)
Indirect contact through an in-group member with an out-group member takes three
forms: learning, observing, and imagining. We give a separate introduction and literature
review to each of these forms.
4.2.3.1 Extended contact
Extended contact is defined as learning that an in-group member interacts with an
out-group member. Several works have documented its effect in intergroup relationships.
Wright et al. [94] shows that if an in-group member has a friend in a particular out-
group, the individual expresses lower prejudice toward that out-group. Pettigrew et al.
[74] surveyed German adults on how many of their German friends have friends who are
foreigners, and their attitudes toward foreigners. They found that the number of friends
who have foreign friends are negatively related with prejudice against foreigners. Even for
groups with intensive intergroup conflicts like the Catholics and Prostestants in Northen
Ireland, individuals expressed reduced prejudice toward the other group if he/she had an
in-group friend engaged in a friendship with a person from that out-group (Paolini et al.
[72]). This mechanism works also for the in-group members who are unknown. Liebkind
and McAlister [60] collect stories of friendship with ethnic minorities from middle school
students in Finland. They conduct distribution, reading, and discussion of these stories in
experimental schools. Compared to the schools that did not go through this intervention
process, subjects’ attitudes toward all minorities improved. It is found that not only
adults, but also children, are influenced by indirect contact. In a work by Cameron et
al. [23], the experimenters read stories of friendship between English and refugees to
elementary school kids. Subsequent surveys show a drop in the negative attitude toward
refugees. Likewise, Cameron and Rutland [22] found that reading stories of friendship
between non-disabled and disabled children increased children’s positive attitude and
intended behavior toward disabled people.
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Turner et al. [91] conducted a study on inter-group contact between white British
and Asians, and looked for the reason behind the indirect contact effect. They found
that, among the four mediators, reduced anxiety, in-group norms, out-group norms, and
inclusion of the out-group itself, each had an independent role in the improved intergroup
relationship.
4.2.3.2 Observed contact
Another form of the indirect contact is observing the friendship of in-group members
with out-group members. In another study of Wright et al. [94], subjects whose group
identity was induced with minimal group paradigm were asked to observe an in-group
member and an out-group member interacting in a puzzle task. The observers expressed
a lower in-group-out-group bias when the relationship between the puzzle-solvers was
perceived as a close friendship. Perhaps the most powerful application of the observed
contact is the media. For example, Schiappa et al. [79] found that viewing television
programs that portrayed positive intergroup contact was associated with lower levels of
prejudice. Compared to explicit expressions and behaviors, implicit racial statements and
actions can also influence intergroup relationships. Weisbuch et al. [92] demonstrated
that television shows which exhibited negative nonverbal behavior toward blacks increase
the viewers’ racial bias.
4.2.3.3 Imagined contact
Probably the most appealing form of the indirect contact is the imagined contact.
According to Crisp and Turner [30], it is the “mental simulation of a social interaction
with a member or members of an outgroup category. ” This is probably the cheapest
intervention among all kinds of social interactions. Nevertheless, it is shown to be effec-
tive in reality. In a recent work by Husnu and Crisp [52], for example, Turkish Cypriots
and Greek Cypriots, on the ethnically diverse island of Cyprus, were repeatedly asked to
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imagine contact with someone from the other group. This imagined intervention alone
increased subjects’ intentions to engage in future contact with the out-group members.
There might be some argument on what drives this mechanism, the person in the imag-
ined contact, or the contact itself. To answer this question, Turner et al. [89] compared
three experiments where young participants imagined an outdoor scene, an elderly per-
son, and talking with an elderly person, respectively. They found that subjects in the
last experiment showed lower levels of intergroup bias than the former. In a similar work
(Turner and Crisp [88]), non-Muslims showed a more positive attitude toward Muslims
after imagining conversation with a Muslim stranger.
4.2.4 Indirect Contact and Intergroup Relationships (Economics)
There are a few works related to the indirect contact effect in economics. Boisjoly et
al. [15] show that if a white student is randomly assigned a black roommate, he/she is
more likely to feel empathy toward all ethnic minorities. In an experiment studied by
Senen and Schram [83], the donor’s decision as to whether or not to provide costly help
to a recipient depends on the history of the recipient’s behavior with third parties.
4.3 The Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental Design
Two students, each from a different college major, are randomly matched to play
a two-player public goods game of ten rounds. In the beginning of every round, each
player is given an endowment of ten experimental credits.1 The players need to invest the
credits in a public fund and a private fund. After investment decisions are made, 50% of
the public investment is added to the public fund by the experimenter. The players then
share the public fund equally with their game partners. Therefore, a player’s earnings
11 experimental credit = 1 Yuan ' $0.16
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by the end of each round are what he/she has invested in the private fund plus half of
the public fund. The investment earnings are not cumulative to subsequent rounds.
In each session, a total of 6 − 12 subjects are randomly seated around a big square
desk. The seating arrangement is illustrated in Figure 4.1. This arrangement allows the
subjects to easily identify in-group members and out-group members. An instruction
sheet is then distributed to every subject and is read aloud by the experimenter. Af-
terwards, subjects are given a game credit sheet to record investment decisions. When
investment decisions are made, the experimenter collects the game credit sheets, calcu-
lates the earnings, and returns them to subjects. When the game credit sheet is returned,
each player sees on the sheet their own earnings and their game partner’s earnings and
proceeds to the next round.
Figure 4.1 Seating Arrangement
A H A 
A H H 
There are three treatments. The first one is referred as Out-group Game Partner
(OGP) treatment. In this treatment, subjects are told explicitly that their game partners
will be someone from the other major. As shown in Figure 4.2, a participant from major A
can only be matched with someone from major H. This treatment is designed to simulate
intergroup cooperation and serves as the baseline treatment. In the second treatment,
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Figure 4.2 Seating Arrangement of Treatment OGP
A H A 
A H H 
referred as Out-group Game Partner with Observed Intergroup Contact (OGPOIC), the
matching procedure is the same as in treatment OGP. In addition, the experimenter pairs
a classmate of one game player and a classmate of the other game player in solving a
jigsaw puzzle. The seating of the puzzle-solving team is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Prior
Figure 4.3 Seating Arrangement of Treatment OGPOIC
A H A 
A H H 
A 
H 
Puzzle  
to the public goods game, the players are asked to watch the whole process of the puzzle-
solving team working together in solving the jigsaw puzzle. There is no time limit for
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completing the puzzle and no evaluation on the puzzle-solving team. This treatment is
designed to test the public contribution of subjects after going through indirect contact.
Comparing treatment OGP and treatment OGPOIC motivates the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Watching intergroup contact increases intergroup cooperation.
Watching in-group members in contact with out-group members has two effects. One
is the indirect contact effect, and the other is the cooperative mood the contact itself
brings to subjects. If the latter is the main force, then there is no need to involve in-group
members in the contact. To separate these two effects, we design the third treatment,
referred as Out-group Game Partner with Observed Random Contact (OGPORC), where
the puzzle-solving team consists of two random students recruited in the campus (Figure
4.4). In this case, the difference of public contribution between treatment OGP
Figure 4.4 Seating Arrangement of Treatment OGPORC
A H A 
A H H 
X 
Y 
Puzzle  
and treatment OGPORC is the effect of watching random contact. The importance of
having an in-group member in the contact is the difference of public contribution between
treatment OGPOIC and treatment OGPORC. Here we propose the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Watching random contact has limited effect on increasing intergroup
cooperation and is not as effective as watching intergroup contact.
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4.3.2 Studying Cooperation with the Public Goods Game
The public goods game is the workhorse for studying cooperation. It simulates a
social situation where it is socially optimal for people to contribute to the society. How-
ever, motivated by pursuing individual interests, the society will end up with an inferior
outcome. In order to see the mechanism in our experiment, suppose a social planner who
maximizes total payoffs. The optimal plan is to invest all endowment in the public fund
for both players. The players will each have a payoff of (10− 10) + 1.5(10 + 10)/2 = 15
credits, with a profit of 5 credits in every round. However, the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is to make zero public investment in each round. To see why, first
suppose a static one-shot public goods game with the game parameters. A player’s total
earnings from investing x credits in the public fund is (10− x) + 1.5(x+y)
2
, where y is the
public investment of the other player. Because this expression is decreasing in x, the
optimal public investment is 0. The two players will end the game with their endowment
of 10 credits. If this is the unique Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game, then the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a 10 round game is zero public contribution
in every round.
4.3.3 The Jigsaw Puzzle in the Indirect Contact
The jigsaw puzzle is the assembly of small, often oddly shaped, interlocking and
tessellating pieces which complete a picture. A natural question is whether this puzzle is
the right tool for intergroup contact. In Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice [4], the author
categorized four conditions that would make the contact effective in improving intergroup
relations. The first is the equal status of the groups in contact. In our design, the two
majors have equal status because they are with similar backgrounds: same university,
same campus, close entrance grades, the same year of entrance. The second condition is
having a common goal for the groups. In the jigsaw puzzle it is clear that the common
goal of the puzzle-solving team is to successfully solve the puzzle. Intergroup cooperation
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is also required. The jigsaw puzzle is viewed as a more cooperative than a competitive or
neutral task. Similar types of puzzles have been used in previous studies. For example, a
three-dimensional puzzle was used in Wright et al.’s [94] work on indirect contact effect.
The last condition is support of authority, law, and customs. In the experiment, the
puzzle solving is supported because it was part of the experiment and has no conflict
with any other law, rules, and convention.
Empirical studies show that these conditions are not essential in reducing intergroup
bias. Each one of the conditions is sufficient to have an impact on improving intergroup
relations (Pettigrew and Tropp [75]). Even contact that does not meet any of these
conditions can be effective in reducing prejudice (Pettigrew et al. [76]).
Combining theories and empiric evidence, the jigsaw puzzle in our design is an effec-
tive tool in intergroup contact.
4.3.4 Data
Players of the public goods game are undergraduate students from College of Horti-
culture and College of Agronomy, Northwest A&F University, China. We first contacted
major supervisors who are in charge of students’ curriculum and non-curriculum activi-
ties about conducting an experiment with the students. When the request is approved,
we received a list of 114 students from each college. The 114 students at the College of
Agriculture consisted of students from three classes of the agronomy major and one class
of the plant sciences major. Their game partners at the College of Horticulture belong
to students from three classes of the horticulture sciences major and one class of the
horticulture facility major. The students are assigned into one of 18 sessions based on
their curriculum schedule. Each session is composed of 3− 6 classmates of each major.
Two students did not show up at the experiment. As a result, their partners did
not participate in the game as well. The two students who showed up but did not
participate in the experiment were compensated with 150 credits (15 yuan in cash). One
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics
College/Treatment Subjects Sessions Female Minority Rural
Agriculture 105 39% 7% 60%
Horticulture 105 52% 10% 54%
OGP 64 6 55% 8% 50%
OGPOIC 86 6 44% 8% 58%
OGPORC 60 5 38% 8% 63%
session was delayed by nearly one hour because of one student’s late arrival. This waiting
process, especially for those from another college, had a significant impact on cooperation
behaviors. The public contribution of this session was obviously much lower than other
sessions. This session was removed from our data analysis.
After excluding problematic subjects and sessions, there are in total 210 valid subjects
and 17 sessions. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the subjects by college
and treatment.
4.4 Results
In this section, we analyze the treatment effect on the cooperative behavior of the
subjects. We first compare the average public investment of the three treatments. To
control for individual characteristics that might be related with the cooperative behav-
ior, we consider individual demographic factors and group features in a cross sectional
regression where the dependent variable is the subject’s average public investment over
all 10 rounds. Because the game is repeated 10 rounds, we also look at individual public
investment in a panel data regression.
Table 4.2 presents the mean, the standard errors, and the 95% confidence intervals
of subjects’ overall public contribution by treatment. The highest average public invest-
ment is in treatment OGPOIC. Subjects contribute in average 80% of their endowment
in the public fund. The public contribution of treatment OGP is the lowest among all
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Table 4.2 Mean Percentage Public Investment
by Treatment
OGP OGPOIC OGPORC
Mean Percentage Contribution 63% 80% 70%
Standard Error 3% 2% 4%
95% Confidence Interval (56%, 70%) (75%, 84%) (63%, 77%)
treatments: subjects in average contribute only 63% of their endowment. In other words,
watching intergroup contact raises the average percentage public investment by 17%. By
comparing the confidence intervals at the 95% level, this increase is statistically signif-
icant. The average contribution of 70% in treatment OGPORC implies that observing
random contact has some impact on subjects’ cooperative behaviors, but this impact is
not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Because the decision of public investment may be related with individual character-
istics and session features, we consider the following equation:
Meanpercentagecontributioni = α + β ·Di + γ ·Xi + i, (4.1)
where Meanpercentagecontributioni is subject i’s average percentage contribution to the
public fund over all rounds, Di is a vector of dummy variables for treatments OGPOIC
and OGPORC, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and i is an error term. The
magnitude and significance level of the coefficient βOGPOIC on the variable OGPOIC
test Hypothesis 1. Compared with a subject in treatment OGP who did not go through
the indirect intergroup contact, subjects in treatment OGPOIC contribute from their
endowment, in average, βOGPOIC percent more in the public goods game. Hypothesis
2 can be tested by checking the significance of the difference between βOGPOIC and
βOGPORC . Because βOGPORC is the increase of public investment after watching random
contact, the difference between βOGPOIC and βOGPORC is the importance of having an
in-group member in the contact.
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Table 4.3 Mean Percentage Public Contribution
Dependent variable: Meanpercentagecontributioni
Baseline treatment: OGP
(1) (2) (3)
OGPOIC 16.67** 16.53** 27.19**
(4.13) (4.42) (9.10)
OGPORC 7.16 5.47 9.34
(4.47) (4.75) (8.16)
Female 6.95 7.71
(3.97) (4.27)
Minority -5.16 0.53
(7.96) (9.17)
Rural 2.01 -0.53
(4.01) (4.18)
Puzzletime -0.00
(0.02)
Gendercomposition 0.02
(0.09)
Groupsize -3.26**
(1.10)
N 192 192 171
R2 0.08 0.21 0.28
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
The first specification is reported in the first column of Table 4.3. The coefficient
on the variable OGPOIC suggests that compared with subjects in treatment OGP,
watching intergroup contact pulls public contribution up by 16.67% of the endowment.
At the significance level of 1%, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Watching random contact has
a positive but insignificant effect of 7.16% on increasing intergroup cooperation. On the
other hand, the 95% confidence intervals of the two β’s suggest that their difference is
significant. Therefore, having an in-group member in the indirect intergroup contact is
important, and hence Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.
When we consider individual characteristics, the results are similar. Watching inter-
group interaction involving in-group members can significantly increase the percentage
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public contribution by 16.5%. The insignificance of the coefficient βOGPORC and its sig-
nificant difference from βOGPOIC again confirms Hypothesis 2. Looking at the individual
characteristics, females contribute 6.95% more of their endowment than males. This
is consistent with the recent public goods experiments by Nowell and Tinkler [71] and
Seguino et al. [80].2 Minorities are less cooperative than Han Chinese by 0.52 units. The
rural/urban status seems to have little impact on cooperative behavior.
In the third specification, group features are added. The first group feature is
Puzzletime, the time that it takes the puzzle solving team to complete the puzzle. It
measures the strength and length of the exposure to the indirect contact, and hence may
have two opposite effects. A shorter Puzzletime may imply that the intergroup contact
is more successful, while a longer one may put observers in greater exposure to the con-
tact. The coefficient suggests that the exposure of the intergroup contact does not matter
for intergroup cooperation. It is possible, however, that the two effects have cancelled
each other. Further investigation is needed. The variable Groupgendercomposition is
the ratio of females in the out-group in a particular session. This variable represents the
expected probability that a subject will be paired with an out-group female in the public
goods game. The results that this ratio does not affect public investment decisions. The
variable Groupsize is also added to control for the possible size effect of the out-group.
The coefficient implies that one more member in the out-group significantly decreases
the public investment by 0.33 credits.
Because the public goods game lasts 10 rounds, it is important to analyze the dynamic
behavior of the subjects. This provides us with more insight into the treatment effect on
public contribution in a particular round. Figure 4.5 compares the percentage public
contribution of the three treatments. It shows a clear pattern of sharply declining public
investment of all treatments in the last round. The reason is straightforward: there
2However, the gender difference in cooperation is not conclusive. For example, Brown-Kruse and
Hummels [17] and Sell et al. [82] find that females contribute significantly less than males. Cadsby and
Maynes [21] and Sell [81] report mixed evidence.
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Figure 4.5 Dynamic Mean Public Investment by Treatment
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is no incentive for future cooperation. Moreover, the three treatments share a similar
shape of public investment that takes a jump of about 15% from the first round to the
second round. The line with solid circles draws the average public fund contribution of
treatment OGP, which is the lowest of all treatments in every round. The contribution
starts from 47% in the first round, jumps to about 62% in the second round, and then
stabilizes between 60% to 70% before reaching the last round. The solid squares are
the average public investment in treatment OGPOIC. Subjects, on average, contribute
54% of their endowment in the first round and gradually increase the contribution to
a maximum of 88% in round 8. Comparing treatments OGP and OGPOIC, for every
round, cooperation is enhanced after watching in-group members in intergroup contact.
The line with solid triangles shows the trend of average public contribution in treatment
OGPORC. The cooperation levels stay between treatment OGPOIC and treatment OGP.
The contribution is 10% to 15% higher than in treatment OGP in the first five rounds and
converges to the latter in the last five rounds. The gap between OGPOIC and OGPORC
is initially small, but gets larger as the game evolves. This justifies Hypothesis 2 that
watching an in-group member is the main force of the intergroup contact effect.
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Like in the mean public contribution analysis, we add individual and group charac-
teristics as explanatory variables to the dynamic individual cooperative behavior:
Percentagecontributioni,j = δ + θ ·Di + η ·Xi + κR + µi,j, (4.2)
where Percentagecontributioni,j is subject i’s percentage public contribution in round
j, R is a vector of dummy variables for j = 1, 2, . . . , 10 rounds.
Results are shown in Table 4.4. The indirect intergroup contact effect on raising
cooperation is about 17%-27%, and it is statistically significant. Although this time
watching random groups in the contact has a significantly positive effect on increasing
cooperation by 5.5%-9.3%, the difference between βOGPOIC and βOGPORC is still signif-
icant. These results again confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The higher public
contribution of female subjects is now significant. A female subject puts 6.9%-7.7% more
in the public fund than male subjects. The effect of the group features are like before.
The time to complete the puzzle and the female ratio in the out-group have little impact
on the cooperation. Having one more member in a session reduces the public investment
significantly by 0.33 credits.
4.5 Conclusions
We find that, relative to the the control treatment, subjects who observe indirect
contact contribute 16.5%-27.2% more of their endowment to the public fund. The effect
of random intergroup contact on raising cooperation is limited and significantly lower
than the indirect intergroup contact. These findings confirm the hypothesis that indirect
contact can improve intergroup relationship, and in turn raise intergroup cooperation.
Our results suggest that indirect contact can be applied when direct contact is re-
stricted. When intergroup cooperation is desired but one or more groups are not avail-
able, we can select some members from each group and do demonstrations to the rest.
This is particularly useful for majority-minority intergroup cooperation, and for groups
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Table 4.4 Dynamic Individual Percentage Pub-
lic Contribution
Dependent variable: Percentagecontributioni,j
Baseline treatment: OGP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OGPOIC 16.67** 16.53** 27.19** 27.19**
(1.90) (1.98) (4.11) (8.80)
OGPORC 7.16** 5.47** 9.34* 9.34
(2.06) (2.13) (3.69) (7.92)
Female 6.95** 7.71** 7.71*
(1.78) (1.93) (3.60)
Minority -5.16 0.53 0.53
(3.57) (4.14) (7.93)
Rural 2.01 -0.53 -0.53
(1.80) (1.89) (3.85)
Puzzletime -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Gendercomposition 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.09)
Groupsize -3.27** -3.27**
(0.50) (1.13)
N 1920 1920 1710 1710
R2 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.18
a. Significance levels of 5% and 1% are denoted by * and **, respectively.
b. Province of origin dummies are included in all columns.
that are segregated in many dimensions. Indirect contact also implies financial freedom,
as getting every group member involved in direct intergroup contact is very costly.
Some questions remain open to future studies. First, is indirect contact as effective as
direct contact? If the answer is yes, the implication is magnificent. For a firm manager
who manages a diversity of employees, direct interaction is often used to eliminate inter-
group bias and to promote cooperation. In this case, indirect intergroup interaction can
save a lot of resources when selected employees demonstrate intergroup contact to the
rest of the employees. Second, because indirect contact has three forms and only one is
tested in the present work, it is desired to test the other two and conduct a comparison
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of these 3 forms. The comparison may include questions like: (1) which is the most
effective intervention and (2) which is the cheapest one. It is also interesting to check
other types of contact. The jigsaw puzzle in our experiment is viewed as a positive and
cooperative task. Do the results stay the same if it is replaced by a competitive or even
negative task?
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CHAPTER 1
Page 1
There are two roles in this experiment: workers and employers. In this section, you will
play the role of the worker. In the next section we will invite you to play the role of the
employer.
Workers have the task to solve as many character puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will be able to perform a few practice puzzles on the next page to familiarize
yourself with the task. For each puzzle that you solve during the 5 minute period, you
will receive 40 credits. For example, if you solve 5 puzzles, you will receive 200 credits.
As a worker, you will be evaluated by several employers who set your wages. Each
employer will see your performance in a timed practice game and might also see your
gender, Hukou, ethnicity or major. The employer’s task is to estimate as precisely as
possible how many puzzles you are able to perform during the 5 minute period. The
employer’s earnings will be higher the better he/she predicts your performance.
The employers’ estimates of your puzzle-solving skills can increase your earnings as a
worker. For each employer, you earnings will increase by the employers’ average esti-
mate of your puzzle-solving skills times 40 credits. For example, if the employers estimate
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on average that you can solve 5 puzzles, then you would receive 5 times 40 = 200 credits
additionally.
Page 2
On this page, you have the opportunity to solve two example puzzles to familiarize
yourself with your task. The square with characters on the right differs from the square
of characters on the left in two letters. You have to find those letters and click on them
to solve the puzzle.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
Page 3
On the next page, you are asked to solve a timed practice game. You see a running clock
that measures your time until you solve the puzzle. This practice time will be visible to
employers who later estimate your puzzle-solving ability.
Remember, that the higher each employers’ average estimate of your puzzle-solving abil-
ity, the higher are your earnings, as the employers’ average estimate will be multiplied
by 40 credits and added to your earnings.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The practice game will start immediately.
Page 4
Please solve this time practice puzzle as quickly as possible.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
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Page 5
On the next page, you are asked to solve as many puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will receive 40 credits for each solved puzzle.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The game will start immediately.
Page 6
Please solve as many puzzles as possible within the next 5 minutes.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
Page 7
In this section of the experiment, you will play the role of the employer.
On the next page, we will ask you to evaluate 10 workers who just completed their 5
minute puzzle-solving task.
As an employer, you have to estimate the performance of each worker. We will provide
you with some basic information about each worker, such as worker’s performance in
the timed practice puzzle. For each worker, you will receive 150 credits if you predict
the worker’s performance in the 5 minute task precisely. If your estimate is off by X
puzzles for this worker, then you will receive 150 credits minus X times 10 credits. For
example: If you predict that the worker can solve 5 puzzles and he or she solves 3,
then your earnings are 130 credits (150 credits minus 2 times 10 credits). Similarly, if
a worker solves 8 puzzles and you predict that he or she can solve 5 puzzles, then your
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estimate is off by 3 and you earn earns 120 credits (150 credits minutes 3 times 10 credits).
Your estimates of a worker’s puzzle-solving skills can increase that worker’s earnings.
Each worker will be evaluated by several employers, and the worker’s earnings will in-
crease by the average estimate of all employers times 40 credits.
Page 8
EVALUATION OF WORKERS’ PRODUCTIVITY
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CHAPTER 2
Page 1
There are two roles in this experiment: workers and employers. In this section, you will
play the role of the worker. In the next section we will invite you to play the role of the
employer.
Workers have the task to solve as many character puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will be able to perform a few practice puzzles on the next page to familiarize
yourself with the task. For each puzzle that you solve during the 5 minute period, you
will receive 40 credits. For example, if you solve 5 puzzles, you will receive 200 credits.
As a worker, you will be evaluated by several employers who set your wages. Each
employer will see your performance in a timed practice game and might also see your
gender, Hukou, ethnicity or major. The employer’s task is to estimate as precisely as
possible how many puzzles you are able to perform during the 5 minute period. The
employer’s earnings will be higher the better he/she predicts your performance.
The employers’ estimates of your puzzle-solving skills can increase your earnings as a
worker. For each employer, you earnings will increase by the employers’ average esti-
mate of your puzzle-solving skills times 40 credits. For example, if the employers estimate
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on average that you can solve 5 puzzles, then you would receive 5 times 40 = 200 credits
additionally.
Page 2
On this page, you have the opportunity to solve two example puzzles to familiarize
yourself with your task. The square with characters on the right differs from the square
of characters on the left in two letters. You have to find those letters and click on them
to solve the puzzle.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
Page 3
On the next page, you are asked to solve a timed practice game. You see a running clock
that measures your time until you solve the puzzle. This practice time will be visible to
employers who later estimate your puzzle-solving ability.
Remember, that the higher each employers’ average estimate of your puzzle-solving abil-
ity, the higher are your earnings, as the employers’ average estimate will be multiplied
by 40 credits and added to your earnings.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The practice game will start immediately.
Page 4
Please solve this time practice puzzle as quickly as possible.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
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Page 5
Your performance in the timed practice puzzle was seconds.
Your next task is to solve as many puzzle as possible within a 5 minute period. You will
receive 40 credits for each solved puzzle. If you take the same amount of time for each
puzzle as you took for the practice puzzle, you are projected to solve puzzles.
Before starting this task, please give your best estimate on how many puzzles you will
be able to solve during these 5 minutes. We will pay you 150 credits if your estimate
is exactly correct. If your estimate is off by X puzzles, then you will receive 150 credits
minus X times 10 credits.
My best estimate for the number of puzzles that I am able to solve in a 5 minute period
is
Page 6
On the next page, you are asked to solve as many puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will receive 40 credits for each solved puzzle.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The game will start immediately.
Page 7
Please solve as many puzzles as possible within the next 5 minutes.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
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Page 8
In this section of the experiment, you will play the role of the employer.
On the next page, we will ask you to evaluate 10 workers who just completed their 5
minute puzzle-solving task.
As an employer, you have to estimate the performance of each worker. We will provide
you with some basic information about each worker, such as worker’s performance in
the timed practice puzzle. For each worker, you will receive 150 credits if you predict
the worker’s performance in the 5 minute task precisely. If your estimate is off by X
puzzles for this worker, then you will receive 150 credits minus X times 10 credits. For
example: If you predict that the worker can solve 5 puzzles and he or she solves 3,
then your earnings are 130 credits (150 credits minus 2 times 10 credits). Similarly, if
a worker solves 8 puzzles and you predict that he or she can solve 5 puzzles, then your
estimate is off by 3 and you earn earns 120 credits (150 credits minutes 3 times 10 credits).
Your estimates of a worker’s puzzle-solving skills can increase that worker’s earnings.
Each worker will be evaluated by several employers, and the worker’s earnings will in-
crease by the average estimate of all employers times 40 credits.
Page 9
EVALUATION OF WORKERS’ PRODUCTIVITY
Page 10
On this page, we give you the opportunity to revise your evaluations of the same 10
workers. This time we also provide you with the worker’s own estimate on how many
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puzzles he or she thinks can solve. For each worker, we remind you of the evaluation you
provided on the previous page.
RE-EVALUATION OF WORKERS’ PRODUCTIVITY
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CHAPTER 3
Page 1
There are two roles in this experiment: workers and employers. In this section, you will
play the role of the worker. In the next section we will invite you to play the role of the
employer.
Workers have the task to solve as many character puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will be able to perform a few practice puzzles on the next page to familiarize
yourself with the task. For each puzzle that you solve during the 5 minute period, you
will receive 40 credits. For example, if you solve 5 puzzles, you will receive 200 credits.
As a worker, you will be evaluated by several employers who set your wages. Each
employer will see your performance in a timed practice game and might also see your
gender, Hukou, ethnicity or major. The employer’s task is to estimate as precisely as
possible how many puzzles you are able to perform during the 5 minute period. The
employer’s earnings will be higher the better he/she predicts your performance.
The employers’ estimates of your puzzle-solving skills can increase your earnings as a
worker. For each employer, you earnings will increase by the employers’ average esti-
mate of your puzzle-solving skills times 40 credits. For example, if the employers estimate
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on average that you can solve 5 puzzles, then you would receive 5 times 40 = 200 credits
additionally.
Page 2
On this page, you have the opportunity to solve two example puzzles to familiarize
yourself with your task. The square with characters on the right differs from the square
of characters on the left in two letters. You have to find those letters and click on them
to solve the puzzle.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
Page 3
On the next page, you are asked to solve a timed practice game. You see a running clock
that measures your time until you solve the puzzle. This practice time will be visible to
employers who later estimate your puzzle-solving ability.
Remember, that the higher each employers’ average estimate of your puzzle-solving abil-
ity, the higher are your earnings, as the employers’ average estimate will be multiplied
by 40 credits and added to your earnings.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The practice game will start immediately.
Page 4
Please solve this time practice puzzle as quickly as possible.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
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Page 5
On the next page, you are asked to solve as many puzzles as possible within a 5 minute
period. You will receive 40 credits for each solved puzzle.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The game will start immediately.
Page 6
Please solve as many puzzles as possible within the next 5 minutes.
CHARACTER PUZZLE
Page 7
In this section of the experiment, you will play the role of the employer.
As an employer, you have to estimate the performance of each worker. We will provide
you with some basic information about each worker, such as worker’s performance in
the timed practice puzzle. For each worker, you will receive 150 credits if you predict
the worker’s performance in the 5 minute task precisely. If your estimate is off by X
puzzles for this worker, then you will receive 150 credits minus X times 10 credits. For
example: If you predict that the worker can solve 5 puzzles and he or she solves 3,
then your earnings are 130 credits (150 credits minus 2 times 10 credits). Similarly, if
a worker solves 8 puzzles and you predict that he or she can solve 5 puzzles, then your
estimate is off by 3 and you earn earns 120 credits (150 credits minutes 3 times 10 credits).
Your estimates of a worker’s puzzle-solving skills can increase that worker’s earnings.
Each worker will be evaluated by several employers, and the worker’s earnings will in-
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crease by the average estimate of all employers times 40 credits.
Page 8
For each worker you evaluate, we will provide you with 3 of the following 4 characteristics
for free: practice time, gender, ethnicity, urban/rural.
One of these 4 characteristics will not be free to view. We will ask you for your willingness
to pay for each of these 4 characteristics. Then we will randomly select one characteristic
and a price you have to pay a price between 0 and 150 credits per worker to see this
information. A computer program has already selected a random price between 0 and
150 for each piece of information. We will not tell you this price. Instead, we will ask
you - for each characteristic - how much you would be willing to pay at most per student
to see that piece of information.
You will see the hidden characteristic only when your willingness to pay is higher than
or equal to the price that is randomly determined by the computer. Please indicate your
willingness to pay for:
- Practice time
- Gender
- Ethnicity
- Urban/rural
Page 9
EVALUATION OF WORKERS’ PRODUCTIVITY
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APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CHAPTER 4
(Treatment OGP)
Participants in this experiment are students from the College of Agriculture and the Col-
lege of Horticulture. The experiment will be in groups of two students. You will be in a
group with someone from the other college. For example, if you are from the College of
Agriculture, you will be in a group with someone from the College of Horticulture, and
vice versa.
Each of you is requested to make a decision on how to invest 10 credits. There is a private
fund and a public fund. For each credit invested in the private fund, you will receive one
credit. Each credit invested in the public fund will yield 1.5 credits for the group. Each
person in the group will receive half of the money in the public fund. Therefore, your
earnings from the investment are the money in your personal fund and half of the public
fund.
The game will repeat 10 rounds. Credits cannot be accumulated to the next round. In
other words, you will start with 10 credits in every round. Your final earnings are the
sum of credits of all 10 rounds.
You will be given a Game Credit Form, on which you record your investment decisions.
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In the end of each round, the experimenter will collect this form, calculate and report
the followings on the form: the other player’s investment decision, the amount of money
in the public fund, your earnings, the other player’s earnings. Afterwards, the form will
be returned to you. When you get the form back, make your investment decision for the
next round.
In the end of the experiment, you can cash in your earnings at the rate of 10 credits to
1 RMB.
Thank you for your participation!
(Treatments OGPOIC and OGPORC)
Participants in this experiment are students from the College of Agriculture and the Col-
lege of Horticulture. The experiment will be in groups of two students. You will be in a
group with someone from the other college. For example, if you are from the College of
Agriculture, you will be in a group with someone from the College of Horticulture, and
vice versa.
Each of you is requested to make a decision on how to invest 10 credits. There is a private
fund and a public fund. For each credit invested in the private fund, you will receive one
credit. Each credit invested in the public fund will yield 1.5 credits for the group. Each
person in the group will receive half of the money in the public fund. Therefore, your
earnings from the investment are the money in your personal fund and half of the public
fund.
The game will repeat 10 rounds. Credits cannot be accumulated to the next round. In
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other words, you will start with 10 credits in every round. Your final earnings are the
sum of credits of all 10 rounds.
You will be given a Game Credit Form, on which you record your investment decisions.
In the end of each round, the experimenter will collect this form, calculate and report
the followings on the form: the other player’s investment decision, the amount of money
in the public fund, your earnings, the other player’s earnings. Afterwards, the form will
be returned to you. When you get the form back, make your investment decision for the
next round.
In the end of the experiment, you can cash in your earnings at the rate of 10 credits to
1 RMB.
Thank you for your participation!
Before the experiment starts, a group of two will be assembling a jigsaw puzzle. Please
stay quiet and patient, and wait until that group completes the jigsaw puzzle.
Thank you for your participation!
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